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WHO’S IN CHARGE?  DOES THE PRESIDENT 
HAVE DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY OVER AGENCY 
REGULATORY DECISIONS? 
Robert V. Percival*
 
 
Most regulatory statutes specify that agency heads rather than the 
President shall make regulatory decisions .1  Yet for more than four decades 
every President has established some program to require pre-decisional 
review and clearance of agency regulatory decisions, usually conducted by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).2  On January 18, 2011, 
President Barack Obama joined his seven predecessors in expressly 
endorsing regulatory review when he signed Executive Order 13,563.3
President Obama’s regulatory review program generally emulates those 
of his two most recent predecessors, relying on OMB’s Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to review only the most 
significant agency rulemaking actions.
 
4  Although this form of presidential 
oversight of rulemaking is now well established, an important, unresolved 
question is whether the President has the authority to dictate the substance 
of regulatory decisions entrusted by statute to agency heads.  While 
proponents of a unitary executive argue in favor of presidential directive 
authority,5
 
* Robert Stanton Professor of Law and the Director of the Environmental Law Program, 
University of Maryland School of Law.  The author would like to express his appreciation to 
Peter Hogge, Esther Houseman, Megan Marzec, Molly Madden, and Helena Mastrogianis 
for their outstanding research assistance with this Article. 
 this article demonstrates that each President’s regulatory review 
program has disclaimed such authority, even though OIRA at times has 
tried to displace agency decisionmaking. 
 1. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006) (specifying that the 
Administrator of EPA shall promulgate and regularly review and revise national ambient air 
quality standards for air pollutants). 
 2. The history of presidential review of rulemaking is comprehensively reviewed in 
Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance:  Executive Office Oversight of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1991) [hereinafter 
Percival, Checks Without Balance], and Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the 
Administrative State:  The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001) [hereinafter 
Percival, Presidential Management]. 
 3. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 4. See id. § 1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. at 3821.  President Obama’s executive order 
supplements and reaffirms the existing regulatory review program established by President 
Bill Clinton under Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), and continued by President 
George W. Bush. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008); Exec. Order No. 13,258, 
3 C.F.R. 204 (2003). 
 5. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
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After describing three principal views on whether the President has 
directive authority, this Article discusses the constitutional foundations of 
this debate.  It then reviews the history of presidential oversight of agencies 
and its implications for the debate over directive authority.  The Article 
concludes by explaining why, even if the President has unfettered removal 
authority over the heads of non-independent agencies, it matters that this 
removal power does not imply the power to control decision making 
entrusted by law to agency heads. 
I.  THREE VIEWS OF PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY 
There are three principal approaches to the question of whether the 
President has directive authority over regulatory decisions entrusted by 
statute to agency heads.  First, the unitary executive theory holds that 
presidential directive authority is constitutionally required (unitary 
executive approach).6  The second approach argues that statutes entrusting 
regulatory decisions to agency heads should be interpreted to grant the 
President directive authority unless they expressly restrict it (“directive 
authority” as an “interpretive principle”).7  The third approach, which the 
author has advocated, is that the President does not have directive authority 
unless a statute expressly gives it to him (“not-so-unitary executive” or 
“disunitary executive” approach).8
Proponents of the unitary executive theory view it as self-evident that the 
President should have directive authority over agency heads.
 
9  They infer 
this authority from the President’s ability to remove the heads of non-
independent agencies, and they argue that independent agencies are 
unconstitutional.  This approach was advocated in Justice Scalia’s lone 
dissent in Morrison v. Olson10 in 1988 when the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act that limited the 
President’s ability to remove independent counsels investigating allegations 
of crime by high executive officers.11  Even though Morrison represents a 
clear rejection of the unitary executive theory, Professors Steven G. 
Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo have argued vociferously for its revival.  
In their book The Unitary Executive:  Presidential Power from Washington 
to Bush12 they maintain that the Vesting Clause of Article II of the 
Constitution, which vests the executive power in the President, “includes 
the power to remove and direct all lower-level executive officials.”13
 
 6. See id. 
  
Reviewing the history of presidential oversight of the executive, Calabresi 
and Yoo claim that no President has acquiesced to any legislative or judicial 
 7. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2330 
(2001). 
 8. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2. 
 9. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5. 
 10. 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 11. Id. at 696–97 (majority opinion). 
 12. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5. 
 13. Id. at 3–4. 
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encroachment on the unitary executive, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
upholding of the constitutionality of Congress’s creating independent 
agencies and of placing limitations on the President’s power to remove their 
leaders.14
In the two decades since Morrison was decided, the Court has become 
more sympathetic to claims of broad presidential removal power.  Last year, 
by a 5–4 majority, the Court invalidated a restriction on the President’s 
ability to remove members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
 
15  The Act provided 
that the members of the PCAOB could only be removed for cause by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission whose members themselves can only 
be removed by the President for cause.16  Although the Court determined 
that this double for-cause restriction on the President’s removal authority 
violated Article II’s vesting of executive power in the President, it did not 
question the constitutionality of independent agencies whose members can 
only be removed for cause.17
The second approach to the question of presidential directive authority 
was proposed by Elena Kagan, prior to becoming a Supreme Court Justice.  
In an influential article entitled Presidential Administration, Kagan argued 
that where Congress has not acted expressly to restrict the President’s 
ability to direct an agency decision, regulatory statutes should be interpreted 
to permit the President to do so.
 
18  She argued that such an interpretive 
principle (“presuming an undifferentiated presidential control of executive 
agency officials”)19 is a more accurate interpretation of congressional intent 
when Congress has not restricted the President’s removal powers.  As 
discussed below, precisely the contrary assumption prevails now and did at 
the time Congress enacted most of the current federal regulatory statutes.20  
Because it was thought that the President did not have the authority to 
dictate regulatory decisions entrusted to agency heads by law, all of the 
executive orders establishing regulatory review programs expressly 
disclaimed such authority.21
 
 14. See generally Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey’s Executor 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
  While OIRA has tried at times, particularly 
during the Reagan Administration, to dictate the substance of regulatory 
 15. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 
(2010). 
 16. Id. at 3148. 
 17. The Court held that dual for-cause limitations on the removal of members of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) unconstitutionally infringed on 
presidential power, but it declined an invitation to invalidate PCAOB on constitutional 
grounds. Id. at 3138. 
 18. See generally Kagan, supra note 7. 
 19. Id. at 2328. 
 20. See, e.g., Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 965; Richard H. Pildes 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995); 
Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Power To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 263, 270–99 (2006); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:  
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 649 (1984). 
 21. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 965 n.7. 
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decisions entrusted to agencies by statute, it was quick to disclaim such 
directive authority whenever its actions were challenged.22
Ten years ago, in a detailed historical review of presidential oversight of 
agencies, I described a third vision of our constitutional scheme as 
reflecting a “not-so-unitary executive” in which the President does not have 
directive authority over decisions entrusted by statute to agency heads.
 
23  
Although I acknowledge that the President’s ability to remove non-
independent agency heads at will gives him enormous power to persuade 
them to accede to his wishes, I argue that presidential directive authority 
cannot be inferred from the removal power.  If an agency head refuses to 
accommodate the President’s policy preferences, there is no constitutional 
problem with the President removing him from office.  But this does not 
imply that the President has the authority to dictate the substance of agency 
decisions that regulatory statutes entrust to agency heads.24
In Part II, after reviewing the constitutional dimensions of the debate 
over presidential directive authority, this Article discusses how statutes 
granting regulatory authority to the executive should be interpreted.  Part III 
then reviews the historical record relevant to directive authority.  It notes 
that every President who established a regulatory review program 
disclaimed directive authority in the context of such review to avoid 
undermining its legality.  The Article concludes in Part IV by explaining 
why the answer to the directive authority question matters even though the 
President’s removal power greatly diminishes the number of incidents in 
which agency heads will be bold enough to defy the President.  As the 
article explains, history demonstrates that the absence of presidential 
directive authority can serve as an important check on presidential abuses of 
power for political ends. 
 
II.  DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY, THE CONSTITUTION, AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
 
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,25
A.  Directive Authority and  the Constitution 
 the President’s authority over 
the agencies under him flows from Article II of the Consitution, but can be 
channeled—within limits—by congressional enactment.  As I discuss 
below, however, neither of these sources supports presidential directive 
authority. 
By now the contours of the constitutional debate over presidential 
directive authority are well known.  Article II of the Constitution vests the 
 
 22. See Robert V. Percival, Rediscovering the Limits of the Regulatory Review Authority 
of the Office of Management and Budget, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,007, 10,019–20 (1987). 
 23. Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2. 
 24. Id. at 1003–06. 
 25. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
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executive power in the President.26  At the Constitutional Convention the 
framers rejected a proposal to share the executive power among the 
members of an executive council in order to create a single, effective, and 
accountable chief executive.27
Other features of the constitutional text cut against the notion that the 
President has directive authority over decisions entrusted by statute to the 
heads of executive agencies.  The establishment of executive agencies is left 
entirely to legislation in Article II, Section 2,
  Proponents of the unitary executive theory 
maintain that Article II’s vesting clause and the rejection of a plural 
executive should be interpreted to give the President both removal at will 
and directive authority over all executive branch officers, rendering 
independent agencies unconstitutional. 
28 leaving it to Congress to 
define “the functions, powers, and duties of the heads of such 
Departments . . . .”29  Article I, Section 8’s famous Necessary and Proper 
Clause refers to “Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof,” suggesting that 
there is no constitutional barrier to Congress vesting powers in agency 
heads.30  When the first U.S. Congress, comprised of many members who 
were delegates to the Constitutional Convention, established the 
Department of Treasury as the second federal agency, it directed the 
Treasury Secretary to submit reports directly to Congress, and it reserved 
the right to require information from him unfiltered by the President.31
The President’s power under Article II, Section 2 to “require the Opinion, 
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, 
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices,” implies 
presidential supervisory authority over agency heads.
 
32
The Constitution is silent on presidential removal powers.  The first 
constitutional debate in Congress, undertaken when Congress created the 
Department of Foreign Affairs to be the first federal agency, occurred over 
the question of whether the President could remove cabinet officers without 
  However, if the 
framers deemed it necessary to make this power explicit, it would seem 
strange not to mention expressly an even more significant directive 
authority.  Article II, Section 2 also provides the President with authority to 
appoint officers of the U.S. “by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate.”  This serves as an important check on presidential power that is 
inconsistent with the notion of presidential directive authority.  If the 
President can control the substance of every agency decision, why would it 
be necessary to have the Senate confirm his nominees to lead the agencies? 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.”). 
 27. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 34. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President power to appoint officers to 
offices “which shall be established by Law.”). 
 29. JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 189 (1925). 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 31. JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA:  1789–1801, at 26–27 (1960). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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obtaining the approval of the Senate.33  Vice President John Adams broke a 
tie in the Senate in July 1789 to resolve the issue in favor of not requiring 
Senate approval before the President could remove the Secretary of 
Treasury.34  Major battles between Congress and the President over the 
removal power occurred at various times throughout history, resulting in the 
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson in 1868,35
The Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 3 requires that the President 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  This clause also is 
frequently cited as support for a unitary executive with presidential 
directive authority.  However, in 1823 Attorney General William Wirt 
issued an opinion declaring that the Take Care Clause had precisely the 
opposite effect.  “If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to 
perform a duty, not only is that officer bound to perform it . . . he would not 
only be not taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would 
be violating them himself.”
 but it now seems 
settled that the President can remove at will the heads of executive 
agencies, save that Congress can require cause for removals of the heads of 
independent agencies. 
36  Wirt maintained that if a statute provides for 
a decision to be made by an agency head, the Take Care Clause does not 
allow the President “to perform the duty, but to see that the officer assigned 
by law performs his duty faithfully.”37
Thirty-five years later, a subsequent Attorney General, Caleb Cushing, 
rejected this view, as I have noted elsewhere.
 
38  Cushing believed that “no 
Head of Department can lawfully perform an official act against the will of 
the President; and that will is by the Constitution to govern the performance 
of all such acts.”39  But Cushing noted that when a statute provides for an 
action to be taken by an agency head, the President must act through the 
official designated by Congress when the President exercises his 
discretion.40
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Marbury v. Madison
 
41 and Kendall v. 
United States42
 By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with 
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his 
 establish that there are certain “ministerial” duties given to 
agency heads by statute with which the President cannot interfere.  In 
Marbury Chief Justice John Marshall declared that: 
 
 33. See generally Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1021 (2006). 
 34. MARGARET C.S. CHRISTMAN, THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS:  1789–1801, at 136 
(1989). 
 35. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the 
Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 667, 746–58 (2003). 
 36. The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625 (1823). 
 37. Id. at 626 (emphasis omitted). 
 38. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 977. 
 39. Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 469–
70 (1855). 
 40. Id. at 468. 
 41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 42. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). 
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own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political 
character and to his own conscience.  To aid him in the performance of 
these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his 
authority, and in conformity with his orders.43
However, Chief Justice Marshall also stated: 
 
 But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other 
duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the 
rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is 
so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and 
cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.44
In Kendall the Court rejected the argument that the Take Care Clause gave 
the President power to countermand a legal requirement that the postmaster 
general make a payment required by statute.
 
45  The Court observed that 
“[t]o contend, that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws 
faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel 
construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”46
In Kendall the Court also declared that the Vesting Clause
  This helps 
clarify a proposition that should be self-evident from the text of the 
Constitution.  Whatever the scope of the President’s directive authority, he 
cannot legally use it to direct a result that is contrary to law.  One 
implication of this could be that if an agency head is acting contrary to law, 
the President’s responsibilities under the Take Care Clause may require him 
to oppose the agency decision.  Certainly a President who removes agency 
heads for failing to follow the law is on sound constitutional ground, while 
a President who seeks to require an agency head to take an illegal action to 
benefit a campaign contributor would not be. 
47
 The executive power is vested in a President; and so far as his powers 
are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other 
department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the 
impeaching power.  But it by no means follows, that every officer in 
every branch of that department is under the exclusive direction of the 
President.  Such a principle, we apprehend, is not, and certainly cannot be 
claimed by the President. 
 did not give 
the President directive authority: 
 There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the 
executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the 
President.  But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot 
impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which 
is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; 
and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject 
to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.  And 
 
 43. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–66. 
 44. Id. at 166. 
 45. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613. 
 46. Id. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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this is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere 
ministerial character.48
As Professor Kevin Stack ably argues, Marbury and Kendall clearly rule 
out presidential directive authority when agency officials have been 
required by Congress to perform non-discretionary, ministerial duties, but 
they leave open the question of whether such authority exists in the context 
of discretionary decisions entrusted to agency heads.
 
49
B.  Directive Authority and Statutory Interpretation 
  Although agencies 
today retain considerable discretion in making most regulatory decisions, 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) subjects them to judicial review 
for fidelity to law, indicating that they do not fall within the class of 
Marbury’s unreviewable political judgments. 
Even if the Constitution does not support the unitary executive theory, 
proponents of directive authority as an interpretive principle maintain that 
such authority should be inferred from legislation that does not expressly 
disclaim it.50  Now-Justice Kagan supports this view by comparing 
delegations of regulatory authority to independent agencies with 
delegations to other executive agencies.51  She argues that delegations to 
independent agencies reflect a congressional intent to insulate certain 
decisions from presidential influence because the President cannot remove 
heads of independent agencies at will.52  Conversely, she maintains that 
delegations to agency heads who are removable by the President at will 
should be interpreted as reflecting an intent to give the President directive 
authority.53  Yet some statutes specify that the President is to make certain 
decisions, while providing that other decisions are to be made by agency 
heads.54
I previously have responded to this argument by noting that some 
regulatory statutes expressly specify the circumstances under which the 
President can suspend decisions made by agency heads.
  Following Attorney General Cushing’s interpretation, Kagan 
maintains that these delegations should be viewed only as establishing who 
has initial responsibility for the decision, without foreclosing the President 
from assuming ultimate responsibility for decisions initially entrusted to 
agency heads. 
55
 
 48. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610. 
  Calling these 
delegations “mixed agency-president delegations,” Professor Stack has 
demonstrated that they have been a not-infrequent feature of legislation 
 49. Stack, supra note 20, at 273. 
 50. See generally Kagan, supra note 7. 
 51. Id. at 2327. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 2327–28. 
 54. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).  Section 104 authorizes the President to direct actions 
responding to releases of hazardous substances, while section 102 requires the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to determine what quantities of 
hazardous substances trigger response authorities. 
 55. Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 1008. 
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since the early days of the republic continuing until today.56  These include 
conditional delegations that “expressly condition the grant of authority to an 
official on the oversight of the President” and agency-specific delegations 
that specify “the agent through whom the President must act.”57  Traditional 
principles of statutory interpretation dictate that if Congress deems it 
necessary in some circumstances to specify when the President may 
exercise authority to override an agency decision, such authority should not 
be inferred when Congress has not so specified.58
III.  UPDATING THE HISTORICAL RECORD ON DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY 
  Indeed, the case for 
inferring that Congress meant something different when it chose not to 
mention the President or to grant him express directive authority in 
regulatory statutes is compelling enough to suggest that there is no 
ambiguity justifying application of principles of constitutional avoidance. 
In previous articles I have reviewed in detail the history of presidential 
review of rulemaking59 and the history of presidential management of the 
administrative state through the first year of the George W. Bush 
Administration.60  Two of the principal proponents of the unitary executive 
theory—Stephen Calabresi and Christopher Yoo—subsequently have 
published a lengthy history examining how each President in U.S. history 
has asserted authority over the executive branch.61  Calabresi and Yoo 
assert that this history demonstrates that “all of our nation’s Presidents have 
believed in the theory of the unitary executive.”62  While they acknowledge 
that the judiciary has confirmed the constitutionality of independent 
agencies, they invite the judiciary to reconsider, maintaining that 
“presidential nonacquiescence to congressional claims of power to create 
independent entities in the executive branch renders congressional historical 
practice irrelevant as a guidepost to constitutional interpretation.”63
Calabresi and Yoo focus most of their historical analysis on presidential 
removal powers, while maintaining that directive authority necessarily 
follows from their unitary executive theory.
 
64
 
 56. Stack, supra note 
  While the breadth of the 
book’s historical review is impressive, their effort to conform history to 
their theory results at times in important omissions or unwarranted “spin” 
on certain historical events.  After reviewing these instances below, the 
article updates the historical record relevant to directive authority from the 
dawn of the George W. Bush Administration to the present.  This update 
includes efforts by the Bush Administration to force the U.S. 
20, at 276–84. 
 57. Id. at 278, 282. 
 58. Id. at 284. 
 59. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2. 
 60. Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2. 
 61. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5. 
 62. Id. at 4. 
 63. Id. at 8. 
 64. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“While it is certainly true that presidential control over the 
executive branch is a complex phenomenon, this book seeks to show that it would be a great 
mistake to underestimate the importance of the removal power.”). 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to veto California’s program to 
control emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), to prevent the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) from licensing “Plan B” emergency 
contraception for non-prescription use, and Vice President Richard 
Cheney’s efforts to force the Office of the Attorney General to approve the 
issuance of a national security directive on warrantless surveillance that 
Justice Department officials believed to be illegal.  In the first two 
controversies White House pressure persuaded agency heads to make 
decisions of questionable legality, both of which have now been overturned.  
Vice President Cheney’s efforts faltered when resignation threats by legal 
officials in the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency ultimately forced significant changes in the 
directive.  Finally, the article examines President Barack Obama’s issuance 
of directives to agency heads, including directives to increase fuel economy 
standards and to reconsider EPA’s veto of California’s regulation of GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles. 
One initial quibble with Calabresi and Yoo’s history concerns their 
account of the origins of presidential review of rulemaking.  Calabresi and 
Yoo maintain that presidential review of agency regulatory actions started 
with the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson.  They maintain that 
Johnson “pioneered what would emerge as a critical device in allowing the 
President to control the execution of the law when he began using the 
oversight responsibilities of the Bureau of the Budget to influence the 
development of important agency regulations.”65  They attribute 
unwarranted significance to this alleged “fact” by asserting that it, 
combined with the use of regulatory review by all subsequent 
administrations, “undercuts any suggestion that OMB review of regulations 
reflects an ideological slant in either direction.”66
While it is true that all Presidents since Richard Nixon have employed 
some form of a regulatory review program, the initial impetus for such 
review was an effort by President Nixon to curb regulatory actions by the 
newly created EPA.
 
67  The only source Calabresi and Yoo cite for the 
assertion that regulatory review originated with the Johnson Administration 
is an interview with former OMB official Jim Tozzi, cited in another 
article.68  Yet Tozzi himself subsequently has told interviewers that 
“[r]eviews of regulations began when Richard Nixon created the 
Environmental Protection Agency.”69
 
 65. Id. at 342. 
 
 66. Id. at 13. 
 67. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 129–38. 
 68. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 342 n.19; Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of 
Power:  Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency 
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 9 & n.19 (1984) 
(citing Interview with Jim Tozzi, former Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Deputy Administrator (June 14, 1983)). 
 69. Dan Davidson, Jim Tozzi:  Nixon’s “Nerd” Turns Regulations Watchdog, 
FEDERALTIMES.COM (Nov 11, 2002), http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20021111_fedtimes-
tozzi.pdf.  During the Johnson Administration, Tozzi was employed by the Office of 
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A.  Regulatory Review in the Nixon Administration 
The origin of OMB review of regulations more properly can be 
understood to date from May 21, 1971 when OMB Director George Shultz 
sent a letter to EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus asserting authority 
to review and clear EPA regulations that were likely to impose significant 
costs or create additional demands on the federal budget.70  EPA was 
directed to submit proposed regulations to OMB thirty days before 
publication and to include analyses of the regulation’s objectives, 
alternatives, and estimates of costs and benefits.71  This program later was 
expanded into what became known as “Quality of Life” (QOL) review.72  
Although the QOL program required that proposed regulations be submitted 
to OMB, who then circulated them to other agencies for comment,73 it is 
significant that OMB was made responsible only for mediating conflicts 
between agencies.  OMB was not given ultimate decision making 
authority.74  Indeed, a proposal that would have allowed OMB to exercise 
directive authority was rejected because of concerns about its legality.75
While nominally applicable to all executive agencies, EPA was the only 
agency routinely subjected to QOL review.
 
76  The review process became a 
convenient vehicle for industry representatives who were members of 
President Nixon’s National Industrial Pollution Control Council (NIPCC) to 
try to influence regulatory decisions.  NIPCC consisted of sixty-three 
corporate executives appointed by Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans who 
met in secret with Stans and other federal officials to air complaints about 
impending regulatory actions.77
 
Budget’s Systems Analysis Group that argued for expanding reviews of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers’ budget to include review of Corps regulations. See Jim Tozzi, 
Commentary of Dr. Alan Schmid’s Paper, THECRE.COM, 
http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/TozziAnalOfEconomicsOfRulemaking.htm (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2011).  The members of the Office of Budget’s Systems Analysis Group later 
helped establish and manage President Nixon’s Quality of Life Review process, which was 
the first presidential regulatory review program. See id.   
  It had been established on April 9, 1970 
 70. GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM?  REAGAN’S REGULATORY 
DILEMMA 47–48 (1984). 
 71. See Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 658–59 (2005). 
 72. See id. 
 73. MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY:  ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 37 (1990). 
 74. See Yoo et al., supra note 71, at 659. 
 75. EADS & FIX, supra note 70, at 48. 
 76. See Yoo et al., supra note 71, at 659. 
 77. The stated purpose of the National Industrial Pollution Control Council (NIPCC) 
was to “‘allow businessmen to communicate regularly with the President, the Council on 
Environmental Quality and other governmental officials and private organizations’” with 
respect to regulatory initiatives. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 130 
(quoting Statement on Establishing the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 344, 344 (Apr. 9, 1970)).  NIPCC’s meetings were not publicly announced and were 
closed to the public. See id. at 168–70.  For example, after discovering that NIPCC would be 
meeting on October 14, 1970, representatives of ten consumer and environmental groups 
showed up at the Department of Commerce and sought to attend the meeting.  The 
Commerce Department not only refused to allow them to attend the meeting, but it also 
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through the issuance of Executive Order 11,523.78  The QOL review 
process has been described as marked by “heated arguments between EPA 
and the Department of Commerce, its principal antagonist, with . . . reviews 
. . . [focused on] industry-prepared information presented by the Commerce 
Department.”79
In the early days of the EPA, fierce battles occurred between the agency 
and the White House.  As I have noted in my previous scholarship,
 
80 
Deputy Administrator John R. Quarles, Jr. reports that he was summoned to 
the White House in an effort to force the EPA to drop one of its first 
enforcement actions against a company whose management had supported 
President Nixon.81  After the incident leaked to the press and a 
congressional hearing was held, the White House backed down and 
Administrator Ruckelshaus pledged to resign “if environmental decisions 
are overruled because of political considerations.”82  Responding to charges 
at a congressional hearing that the QOL review process had forced the EPA 
to weaken regulations implementing the Clean Air Act, EPA Administrator 
William Ruckelshaus asserted that he, and not OMB, had made the final 
decision about the regulations.83  Ruckelshaus vociferously argued that 
Executive Office officials were not making decisions for EPA and “[i]f they 
were, I would be breaking the law, and I would not function as 
Administrator of this Agency if I let them do so.”84  To reinforce 
Ruckelshaus’s claim that OMB lacked directive authority, OMB Director 
George Shultz advised the committee in writing that “EPA has final 
authority on plans for implementation of air quality standards under the 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970.”85
 
refused their request to provide a transcript of it. See E.W. Kenworthy, U.S. Pollution 
Control Panel Bars Environmental and Consumer Observers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1970, at 
40.  Commerce Department officials refused reporters’ request for a press conference. See 
Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra, at 169.  The NIPCC, however, subsequently 
released summary minutes of some of its meetings. See Implementation of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970—Part 2:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of 
the S. Comm. on Pub. Works, 92d Cong. 583–94 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings].  These 
summaries, however, amounted to little more than “a skeletal outline of the issues discussed, 
evidently thoroughly sanitized.” William H. Rodgers, Jr., The National Industrial Pollution 
Control Council:  Advise or Collude?, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 719, 727 (1972).  The 
members of the NIPCC apparently edited the draft summaries extensively “with the 
consequence that all damaging, and some useful, information has disappeared from the 
public record.” Id. 
  These incidents powerfully indicate 
that it was well understood that the President lacked directive authority over 
agency regulatory decisions. 
 78. Exec. Order No. 11,523, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1966–1970). 
 79. EADS & FIX, supra note 70, at 49. 
 80. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 135. 
 81. See JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA:  AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 58–76 (1976). 
 82. Id. at 68–70. 
 83. Hearings, supra note 77, at 325 (testimony of William Ruckelshaus). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 338. 
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Disputes between EPA and the White House were so heated that 
Administrator Ruckelshaus insisted as a condition for remaining EPA 
Administrator after the 1972 election that he receive written assurance from 
the President that the EPA Administrator retained the ultimate authority for 
EPA policy decisions.86  President Nixon verbally agreed to this, but EPA 
“bargained in vain with OMB” to spell it out in writing.87
When appointed to succeed Ruckelshaus as EPA Administrator during 
the summer of 1973, Russell Train also insisted upon written assurances 
that he retained ultimate policy authority.
 
88  At his confirmation hearing, 
Train emphasized that it was “of crucial importance that EPA establish and 
maintain at all times a strongly independent role.” 89  He asserted that while 
he would welcome comments from within the government, he alone would 
make all final EPA regulatory decisions.90  Train announced that he had 
“already discussed this matter with responsible officials in OMB” and that 
he had “full concurrence[] that all processes of interagency comment, 
review, and suggestion with respect to proposed regulatory decisions by the 
Administrator of EPA will be directed by the Administrator of EPA and be 
conducted by him and on his behalf, not controlled by the Office of 
Management and Budget.”91
Train carried out this promise, as illustrated by his reaction to the fierce 
lobbying he was subjected to when EPA issued the first regulations limiting 
the amount of lead that could be placed in leaded gasoline.
 
92  Despite strong 
opposition from presidential aides and OMB and Interior officials, Train 
ultimately established the lead limits he initially wanted, while extending 
the final deadline for lead phasedown by one year.93
While this demonstrates that it was understood from the first days of 
EPA that neither the President nor OMB had directive authority over the 
agency, Calabresi and Yoo place a rather different spin on this history.  
They assert that the inability of Ruckelshaus or Train to obtain written 
assurances of their independence demonstrates that administrative control 
was centralized in OMB.  Calabresi and Yoo criticize my conclusion that 
this history is evidence of agency independence and maintain that it is 
“consistent with the unitary executive” because “resignation or removal is 
the natural outcome under our theory when an executive official finds 
himself or herself out of step with administration policy.”
 
94
 
 86. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 
  Yet this history 
demonstrates that both Administrators Ruckelshaus and Train successfully 
2, at 137. 
 87. QUARLES, supra note 81, at 117–19. 
 88. Id. at 119. 
 89. Nomination of Russell E. Train:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Works, 93rd 
Cong. 3 (1973) (“I assure you that I, as Administrator, will make the final decisions.  I will 
seek and welcome comments and suggestions both from within Government and from the 
public, but the final decisions will be mine.” (statement of Russell E. Train)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 8 (statement of Russell E. Train). 
 92. See QUARLES, supra note 81, at 117–42. 
 93. Id. at 138. 
 94. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 348. 
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resisted White House efforts to influence EPA policy, something that could 
not occur if the President actually possessed directive authority.95
B.  Regulatory Review During the Ford and Carter Administrations 
 
Both the Ford and Carter Administrations shifted the focus of 
presidential oversight away from prepublication review of agency actions in 
favor of review during the public comment period mandated by the APA.96  
President Ford’s Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS), part of the 
Executive Office of the President, submitted written statements on the 
inflationary impact of proposed rules to the agency rulemaking record 
during the public comment period.97  The White House did not assert that it 
possessed directive authority.  Instead it sought to influence agency 
decisions by having CWPS participate in rulemaking proceedings with 
CWPS officials often testifying at agency hearings.98  Congress expressly 
endorsed this practice when it amended CWPS’s enabling act in 1975.99
The Ford Administration’s continuation of QOL review was more 
controversial than its new inflation impact analysis requirement.  
Reviewing OMB’s management of the QOL review program, the 
Environment Reporter concluded in 1976:  “The Office of Management and 
Budget plays an influential part in shaping federal environmental policies, 
frequently with little public awareness or understanding of its role.”
 
100  
Repeating some of the same criticisms made during the Nixon 
Administration, the report noted that EPA officials believed that their 
Agency had been unfairly “singled out” for QOL reviews and that other 
federal agencies sought to use the review process to weaken EPA 
regulations.101
 
 95. Calabresi and Yoo also maintain that President Nixon’s resignation showed that an 
independent counsel law is not needed. Id. at 355.  Yet Nixon’s downfall was the direct 
result of a special prosecutor who effectively could not be fired by the President seeking and 
obtaining White House tapes that proved the President’s culpability in Watergate.  Had 
Justice Scalia’s position in Morrison v. Olson prevailed, the only effective check on 
presidential wrongdoing would be at the ballot box, which was no check at all on a President 
who had begun his second and last term. 
 
 96. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006); see George C. Eads, White House Oversight of Executive 
Branch Regulation, in SOCIAL REGULATION:  STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 177, 192–93 (Eugene 
Bardach & Robert A. Kagan eds., 1982). 
 97. See Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 
(1974). 
 98. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 139–40. 
 99. Congress confirmed CWPS’s authority to “intervene and otherwise participate on its 
own behalf in rulemaking, ratemaking, licensing and other proceedings before any of the 
departments and agencies of the United States, in order to present its views as to the 
inflationary impact that might result from the possible outcomes of such proceedings.” Pub. 
L. No. 94-78 § 4, 89 Stat. 411, 411 (1974); see NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL 
MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN REGULATORY AGENCIES 9 (1987); Office of Management 
and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental Policymaking, Faces Little External 
Review, 7 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 693 (1976) [hereinafter Office of Mgmt. & Budget]. 
 100. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 99, at 693. 
 101. Id. 
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President Jimmy Carter surprised some observers by playing a more 
active role than President Gerald Ford in efforts to temper agency 
regulations.  But as in the Ford Administration, the Carter Administration’s 
regulatory review program, established by Executive Order 12,044,102 was 
expressly structured to respect rulemaking procedures required by the APA 
and underlying regulatory statutes.  Carter’s Regulatory Analysis Review 
Group (RARG), which was responsible for assessing the economic impact 
of proposed rules, conducted its reviews on the public record during the 
normal course of agency rulemaking proceedings.103  RARG reviewers 
could not attempt to prevent agencies from issuing proposed rules because 
RARG review occurred only after proposed rules were published in the 
Federal Register.  RARG reviews produced public documents summarizing 
the reviewers’ concerns, which were submitted to the rulemaking record.104
In a few cases President Carter was involved in efforts to influence 
agency regulatory decisions.  The most famous of these occurred on April 
30, 1979, when he met with EPA Administrator Douglas Costle and other 
officials at the White House to discuss a new source performance standard 
(NSPS) for coal-fired power plants that the agency was about to promulgate 
pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act.  Environmental groups 
challenging the NSPS promulgated in June 1979 argued that EPA’s failure 
to mention this meeting in the public docket of the rulemaking denied them 
due process and violated statutory docketing requirements established by 
the Clean Air Act.  However, in Sierra Club v. Costle
  
The RARG program encouraged agencies to take a harder look at 
alternatives to proposed regulations, while leaving the ultimate regulatory 
decisions to the agency designated by statute to issue the regulation. 
105 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected these arguments, finding that the 
regulations were not based on information arising from the meeting.106  
Writing for the majority, Judge Patricia Wald went on in dictum to 
recognize not only the constitutional authority of the President to supervise 
executive policymaking, citing Myers v. United States,107 but also the 
desirability of such presidential oversight.108
 
 102. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979) (issued on March 23, 1978). 
 
 103. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 144–45. 
 104. See id. at 145. 
 105. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 106. Id. at 410. 
 107. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 108.  
  The authority of the President to control and supervise executive policymaking 
is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is demonstrable 
from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking. . . . Our form of 
government simply could not function effectively or rationally if key executive 
policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief Executive.  Single 
mission agencies do not always have the answers to complex regulatory problems.  
An overworked administrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to a dedicated but 
zealous staff needs to know the arguments and ideas of policymakers in other 
agencies as well as in the White House. 
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 406 (internal citations omitted).  Surprisingly, Calabresi and Yoo do 
not discuss Sierra Club v. Costle in their discussion of President Carter’s Administration, 
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A close reading of Judge Wald’s opinion indicates that it recognizes 
limits on the President’s supervisory authority over agency heads.  Her 
discussion of the relationship between the President and the EPA 
Administrator appears to assume that the Administrator retains ultimate 
responsibility for the regulatory decision.  Judge Wald notes that the 
Administrator “needs to know the arguments” of White House staff, not 
that she must ultimately adopt them.109  She recognizes that the President 
may be successful in “prodding” the Administrator into adopting a different 
regulation,110
At the close of the Carter Administration in 1980, Congress enacted the 
Paperwork Reduction Act,
 but she does not imply that the President has the authority to 
dictate the result. 
111  which provided OMB with its first statutory 
basis for regulatory review.  The Paperwork Reduction Act requires 
agencies to obtain clearance for all requests to collect information from the 
public and it created OIRA in OMB, which is now responsible for 
conducting regulatory reviews.112  However, the Paperwork Reduction Act 
does not provide any basis for inferring directive authority granted by 
Congress.  The Act expressly provides that it shall not increase the authority 
of the President or OMB with respect to agency substantive policy.113
C.  Regulatory Review during the Reagan Administration 
 
Less than a month after taking office, President Ronald Reagan launched 
his Administration’s regulatory review program by issuing Executive Order 
12,291.114
 
even though Judge Wald’s dictum probably comes closest of any judicial opinion to support 
their argument for presidential directive authority. 
  The Reagan regulatory review program was a significant 
departure from its predecessors in several important respects.  First, it 
centralized unprecedented power in OIRA.  Unlike previous programs that 
only required review of selected regulations, the Reagan program required 
that all proposed and final regulations be submitted to OMB for 
 109. Id. 
 110.  
  Of course, it is always possible that undisclosed presidential prodding may 
direct an outcome that is factually based on the record, but different from the 
outcome that would have obtained in the absence of presidential involvement.  In 
such a case, it would be true that the political process did affect the outcome in a 
way the courts could not police.  But we do not believe that Congress intended that 
the courts convert informal rulemaking into a rarified technocratic process, 
unaffected by political considerations or the presence of presidential power. 
Id. at 408. 
 111. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. 
§§ 3501–3521 (2006)). 
 112. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3503, 3507. 
 113. Id. § 3518(e) (2006) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall be interpreted as increasing 
or decreasing the authority of the President, the Office of Management and Budget or the 
Director thereof, under the laws of the United States, with respect to the substantive policies 
and programs of departments, agencies and offices . . . .”). 
 114. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (issued on February 17, 1981). 
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prepublication review.115  Even more significantly, the Reagan program 
purported to give OMB the authority to block publication of regulations for 
an indefinite period while review was pending.  Unlike RARG reviews that 
were conducted during the course of public rulemaking proceedings, the 
Reagan executive order directed agencies to  “refrain from publishing” any 
rule until OMB had completed its review.116
The Reagan regulatory review program also specified substantive criteria 
for agencies to use in setting regulatory standards.  Executive Order 12,291 
directed agencies not simply to analyze the costs of regulation but to base 
regulatory decisions on the results of cost-benefit analysis.
 
117  The executive 
order specified not only that least-cost regulatory alternatives be selected 
but also that agencies should not regulate unless cost-benefit analysis 
demonstrated that the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs.118  The 
Reagan Administration later supplemented Executive Order 12,291 with 
Executive Order 12,498 on January 4, 1985.119  This order required 
agencies to submit annually to OMB for review a list of all significant 
regulatory actions they planned to take during the next year.120
Despite the boldness of its shift to a centralized system of regulatory 
review for virtually all agency actions, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 
included some legal qualifications that are highly significant for the debate 
over directive authority.  Both executive orders provided that OMB is 
authorized to take action only “to the extent permitted by law.”
 
121  
Executive Order 12,291 also specified that nothing in the order “shall be 
construed as displacing the agencies’ responsibilities delegated by law.”122  
In its opinion supporting the legality of Executive Order 12,291, the U.S. 
Department of Justice emphasized that “the President’s exercise of 
supervisory powers must conform to legislation enacted by Congress.”123  
Therefore, “the President may not, as a general proposition, require or 
permit agencies to transgress boundaries set by Congress.”124
 
 115. Section 8(b) of Executive Order 12,291 did authorize the OMB to exempt certain 
types of regulations from review.  Section 8(a) purported to exempt from the prepublication 
review requirement regulations that respond to emergency situations and regulations for 
which review would conflict with statutory or judicial deadlines.  OMB generally ignored 
Section 8(a) until they were successfully sued in Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 
627 F. Supp. 566, 567 (D.D.C. 1986), for illegally blocking promulgation of a regulation 
subject to an expired statutory deadline. 
  To prevent 
the President from usurping authority delegated to EPA, the executive 
 116. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 129–30. 
 117. See id. § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 129. 
 118. Id. § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 128. 
 119. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986). 
 120. See id. §§ 1–2, 3 C.F.R. at 323–24. 
 121. Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 325; Exec. Order No. 12,291, §§ 2, 3(a), 
6(a), 7(e), 3 C.F.R. at 127–28, 131–32. 
 122. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 130. 
 123. Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Proposed 
Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation” (Feb. 13, 1981), reprinted in Role of OMB in 
Regulation:  Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation of H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. 486, 488 (1981). 
 124. Id. 
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orders are founded on the theory that OMB’s role is an “advisory and 
consultative” one that does not include authority to reject an agency’s 
ultimate judgment on matters delegated to it by law.125  Thus, it is clear that 
President Reagan deliberately chose not to assert directive authority over 
agency decision making.126
Several studies of the Reagan regulatory review program have noted that, 
despite eschewing directive authority, OMB tried mightily to dictate the 
substance of agency decision making.
 
127  OMB’s strategy was to use its 
power under Executive Order 12,291 to invoke the “extended review” 
provisions contained in section 3(f).  If OMB notified an agency that it was 
extending its review beyond the normal ten- or sixty-day review period, 
Executive Order 12,291 directed the agency to “refrain from publishing” 
the rule until OMB’s review was concluded.128  This provision enabled 
OMB to block regulations it disfavored for an indefinite period of time.  
Although OMB officials initially denied that they used delay as a tool to 
influence the substance of rules, they announced in 1989 that they would 
pursue a “new direction” that would not use delay to block rules.129
OMB’s conversion may have been a response to an important judicial 
decision confirming the illegality of using regulatory review to delay rules 
subject to statutory deadlines.  In Environmental Defense Fund v. 
 
 
 125. Id. at 492. 
 126. After conceding that “Reagan specifically disclaimed any intent to direct agency 
decisionmaking,” Calabresi and Yoo cite my prior scholarship on regulatory review to 
support this statement:  “Even opponents of the unitary executive theory recognized that the 
[Reagan] regulatory review program did in fact have a direct impact on regulatory outcomes 
and represented one of the most sweeping invocations of the unitary executive yet seen.” 
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 381. 
 127. See Olson, supra note 68 (dicussing OMB’s substantive impact on rulemaking, 
focusing on EPA regulations); Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 161–68.  
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford, initially an enthusiastic promoter of the 
program, later testified that while Presidential oversight of rulemaking is appropriate, “there 
were some serious abuses” by OMB. EPA:  Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses 
(Part 3):  Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 234 (1983) (testimony of Anne Gorsuch Burford).  Claims 
of abuses by OMB in conducting regulatory reviews were explored in detail in a series of 
oversight hearings by congressional committees. See, e.g., OMB Review of EPA Regulations:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 99th Cong. (1986); Oversight of the Office of Management and Budget 
Regulatory Review and Planning Process:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Intergovernmental Relations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong. (1986); 
EPA:  Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses, supra; EPA’s Asbestos Regulations:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 99th Cong. (1985); Office of Management and Budget Control of OSHA 
Rulemaking:  Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 
97th Cong. (1982); Role of OMB in Regulation:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
& Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. (1981). 
 128. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 127, 129–30 (1982). 
 129. OMB Director Richard Darman reportedly instructed OMB staff that, rather than 
delaying rules indefinitely, they were to meet with agency staff and “‘try to hash it out’” in 
cases where “‘genuine disagreement exists.’” OMB Official Promises End to Rule Delays, 
But RCRA Rule Still at Agency After Seven Months, 20 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 8 (1989) (quoting 
Robert Grady, Assoc. Director, OMB). 
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Thomas130 a federal district court held that Reagan’s OMB had acted 
illegally in blocking EPA from issuing a regulation that was subject to a 
statutory deadline that had expired.  The court flatly declared:  “OMB has 
no authority to use its regulatory review under EO 12291 to delay 
promulgation of EPA regulations . . . beyond the date of a statutory 
deadline.”131  The court reasoned that although a “certain degree of 
deference must be given to the authority of the President to control and 
supervise executive policymaking,” action to block promulgation of 
regulations required by statute “is incompatible with the will of Congress 
and cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the President’s Article II 
powers.”132
The court implicitly rejected the notion that OMB had directive authority 
over EPA, noting that “the use of EO 12291 to create delays and to impose 
substantive changes raises some constitutional concerns.”
 
133
Congress enacts environmental legislation after years of study and 
deliberation, and then delegates to the expert judgment of the EPA 
Administrator the authority to issue regulations carrying out the aims of 
the law.  Under EO 12291, if used improperly, OMB could withhold 
approval until the acceptance of certain content in the promulgation of 
any new EPA regulation, thereby encroaching upon the independence and 
expertise of EPA.  Further, unsuccessful executive lobbying on Capitol 
Hill can still be pursued administratively by delaying the enactment of 
regulations beyond the date of a statutory deadline.
  As the court 
explained: 
134
D.  Regulatory Review During the George H.W. Bush Administration 
 
After pledging during the 1988 presidential campaign to be “the 
environmental President,” President George H.W. Bush won an important 
victory when he shepherded comprehensive amendments to the Clean Air 
Act through Congress, which were approved by overwhelming, bipartisan 
majorities in both houses in 1990.135
 
 130. 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986). 
  But later in his term, with the 
economy weakening and another election approaching, President Bush did 
 131. Id. at 571.  In the interests of full disclosure, the author was lead counsel for the 
Environmental Defense Fund in this litigation. 
 132. Id. at 570. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. Remarkably, Calabresi and Yoo cite this decision for the proposition that, 
although President “Reagan did not invoke any particular statutory authority for issuing 
these orders, . . . [c]ourts reviewing these orders apparently agreed” with the President’s 
assertion of authority. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 381.  In a footnote they cite the 
court’s statement that “[a] certain degree of deference must be given to the authority of the 
President to control and supervise executive policymaking,” without mentioning that the 
Court ruled that OMB had acted illegally by seeking to prevent EPA from performing its 
statutory duty. Id. at 501 n.51. 
 135. An Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) 
(codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.); see Steven J. Shimberg, Stratospheric 
Ozone and Climate Protection:  Domestic Legislation and the International Process, 21 
ENVTL. L. 2175, 2180–81 (1991) (discussing the congressional votes). 
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an about face and blamed excessive regulation for the soft economy.136  He 
imposed and extended a regulatory moratorium that delayed 
implementation of his signature environmental achievement—the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments.137
Bush had agreed to continue the regulatory review program established 
during the Reagan Administration.
 
138  When the Paperwork Reduction Act 
came up for reauthorization in 1989, congressional critics of OMB sought 
to enact requirements to ensure greater public disclosure of OMB’s 
regulatory review activities.139  While OMB agreed to implement the 
disclosure procedures voluntarily, the Bush Administration ultimately 
refused to approve the deal.140  In retaliation, Congress refused to confirm a 
new administrator for OIRA.141  While OIRA continued to conduct 
regulatory reviews, its activities were overshadowed by a new interagency 
task force known as the Council on Competitiveness, created in 1989 and 
chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle.142  The Council was designed to 
serve as the successor to the Reagan Administration’s Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief, which Bush had chaired at the beginning of the Reagan 
Administration before it had been disbanded in 1983.143  Bush authorized 
the Council to intervene in disputes between OMB and agencies that arose 
in the course of regulatory reviews.144
The membership of the Council on Competitiveness was heavily tilted 
toward agencies unlikely to be sympathetic to regulation, including the 
director of OMB, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Treasury, the 
chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, the White 
House Chief of Staff, and the Attorney General.
 
145  The Council described 
its mission entirely as reducing regulatory burdens, rather than improving 
the net benefits of regulation.146
In its first major regulatory intervention, the Council disapproved an EPA 
NSPS for municipal incinerators that banned incineration of lead acid 
 
 
 136. See Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Moment:  What a Historical 
Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has To Teach 
Environmentalists Today, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 337 (2001). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 993. 
 139. See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:  
The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 167–68 (1995). 
 140. See id. at 168. 
 141. See id.  
 142. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 155. 
 143. When he announced the creation of the Council on Competitiveness on February 9, 
1989, President George H.W. Bush confirmed that “[i]n reviewing regulatory matters, the 
Council will be continuing the work of the former President’s Task Force on Regulatory 
Relief . . . .” EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1, 1990–MARCH 31, 1991, at 5 (1990). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 155. 
 146. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 143, at 5 (“The Council will 
work closely with OIRA to augment the regulatory review process, ensure that the benefits 
of regulation outweigh their costs, and coordinate development of legislative and 
administrative initiatives to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens.”). 
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batteries and required recycling of twenty-five percent of waste streams.147  
Ironically, the recycling requirement had been touted by the Bush 
Administration a year before “as a remedy to the nation’s burgeoning solid 
waste problem.”148  The Council issued a triumphant press release declaring 
that it had slayed a regulatory dragon, forgetting the fiction that agencies 
were supposed to retain the ultimate decisionmaking authority.149  
Although EPA complied with the Council’s “decision,” when the NSPS 
was challenged in court, the deletion of the ban on lead acid batteries was 
struck down as not adequately justified.150
There was no consistent pattern concerning the stage of the regulatory 
process at which Competitiveness Council review occurred.  While the 
Council reviewed incinerator NSPS on the eve of final promulgation, it also 
attempted to dictate changes to a wetlands delineation manual during 
extensive pre-proposal review.
 
151  In a March 22, 1991 Memorandum to the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Vice President Quayle 
asserted that the Council had jurisdiction over an extraordinarily broad 
range of agency activities including even agency issuances of press 
releases.152  Most agencies apparently ignored this directive.153
In 1992 the George H.W. Bush Administration also was involved in a 
controversy over efforts to exempt the Bureau of Land Management from 
compliance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for sales of timber 
from public lands.  Using a special procedure provided in the Act,
 
154 the 
Administration convened an Endangered Species Committee, popularly 
know as the “God squad,” that held a hearing to determine whether an 
exemption should be granted.  Pursuant to the statute, the Committee 
consisted of six administration officials and one representative of the 
affected states.155
 
 147. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 
  On May 15, 1992, the Committee voted 5–2 to approve 
2, at 155. 
 148. Michael Weisskopf, EPA Proposal on Recycling Is Trashed, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 
1990, at A17. 
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Clean Air Act Implementation (Part 1):  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health & the 
Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102d Cong. 164–65 (1991). 
 150. New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 151. See E. Donald Elliot, Portage Strategies for Adapting Environmental Law and 
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Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1442 n.271 (1992). 
 153. See id. (“If the executive agencies had taken this directive seriously, OMB would 
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 154. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires federal agencies to 
ensure that their actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).  However, section 7(h) of the ESA 
allows a specially-convened interagency committee known as the “God squad” to grant an 
exemption if it determines, following a formal adjudicatory hearing, that “there are no 
reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action” and that the action meets three 
other requirements. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i). 
 155. The seven-member Committee was comprised of:  the Secretary of Agriculture, the 
Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of the Interior, the 
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and “one individual 
2508 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
the exemption.156  When this decision was challenged in court, it was 
revealed that White House officials had put substantial pressure on the 
Committee members to vote for the exemption, including summoning three 
members to the White House.157
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that it was illegal 
for the White House to have ex parte contacts with the members of the 
“God squad” while they were considering the exemption because the 
hearing they were conducting was a formal adjudication.
 
158  The APA 
prohibits ex parte contacts by any “interested person outside the agency” 
with those involved in the decisional processes of formal adjudications.159  
Noting that “the Committee is, in effect, an administrative court,” the Ninth 
Circuit stated that “[e]x parte contacts are antithetical to the very concept of 
an administrative court reaching impartial decisions through formal 
adjudication.”160  The court rejected the Administration’s arguments that 
neither the President nor any of the members of his staff could be 
considered an “interested person outside the agency.”161
As the head of government and chief executive officer, the President 
necessarily has an interest in every agency proceeding.  No ex parte 
communication is more likely to influence an agency than one from the 
President or a member of his staff.  No communication from any other 
person is more likely to deprive the parties and the public of their right to 
effective participation in a key governmental decision at a most crucial 
time.
  The court 
observed that: 
162
Responding to the Administration’s argument that the President, as the 
head of the executive branch, cannot be deemed to be “outside the agency,” 
the court noted: 
 
The Supreme Court soundly rejected the basic logic of this argument in 
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy.  The Court held that where 
legally binding regulations delegated a particular discretionary decision to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Attorney General could not dictate 
a decision of the Board, even though the Board was appointed by the 
Attorney General, its members served at his pleasure, and its decision was 
subject to his ultimate review.  Here, the Endangered Species Act 
explicitly vests discretion to make exemption decisions in the Committee 
and does not contemplate that the President or the White House will 
 
from each affected State” appointed by the President, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3), with the state 
representatives having one collective vote. Committee Meetings, 50 C.F.R. § 453.05(d) 
(1991). 
 156. See Scott A. Powell, Comment, Global Protection of Threatened and Endangered 
Species:  Rethinking Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 523, 
529 n.29 (1995). 
 157. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1538 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
 158. See id. at 1543. 
 159. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 160. Portland Audubon, 984 F.2d at 1543. 
 161. See id. at 1546. 
 162. Id. at 1545 (emphasis omitted). 
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become involved in Committee deliberations.  The President and his aides 
are not a part of the Committee decision-making process. They are 
“outside the agency” for the purposes of the ex parte communications 
ban.163
The court noted that the ESA does contain one mixed agency-President 
delegation giving the President ultimate decisionmaking authority on 
exemption applications relating to restoration of a public facility in a 
disaster area,
 
164 but it noted that the Act did not provide for the President’s 
involvement in the God squad’s deliberative process.165
Finally, the court rejected the Administration’s claim that it would be a 
violation of constitutional principles of separation of powers for the APA to 
bar the President from pressuring committee members.  The court observed: 
 
 While the government’s argument to the contrary arises in the context 
of Committee decisions regarding Endangered Species Act exemption 
applications, carried to its logical conclusion the government’s position 
would effectively destroy the integrity of all federal agency adjudications.  
It is a fundamental precept of administrative law that . . . when an agency 
performs a quasi-judicial (or a quasi-legislative) function its independence 
must be protected.  There is no presidential prerogative to influence quasi-
judicial administrative agency proceedings through behind-the-scenes 
lobbying.  Myers itself clearly recognizes that “there may be duties of a 
quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and members of 
executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of 
individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular 
case properly influence or control.”  And in Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States the Court observed that “[t]he authority of Congress, in 
creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act 
in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well 
be doubted.”  The government’s position in this case is antithetical to and 
destructive of these elementary legal precepts, and we unequivocally 
reject it.166
 One of the most celebrated regulatory disputes during the George H.W. 
Bush Administration involved a conflict between the FDA and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) that reached a dénouement shortly 
before President Bill Clinton assumed office.  FDA was charged with 
issuing regulations to implement the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act 
of 1990.
 
167  When the USDA objected that FDA’s preferred regulations 
were likely to reduce meat consumption by making it easier for consumers 
to learn the fat content of food products, OMB sided with USDA.168
 
 163. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
  FDA 
refused to back down, believing that the statute’s purpose was to make it 
 164. On mixed agency-President delegations see the text accompanying note 56. 
 165. Portland Audubon, 984 F.2d at 1545 n.24. 
 166. Id. at 1546–47 (internal citations omitted). 
 167. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
 168. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT:  A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A 
DEADLY INDUSTRY 57–58 (2001). 
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easier for consumers to understand nutrition data, rather than to protect the 
economic interest of the politically powerful livestock industry.169
As then-FDA Commissioner David Kessler notes, OMB repeatedly 
refused to approve FDA’s draft final rule, which it kept returning to the 
FDA with amendments that “had been taken almost verbatim from industry 
comments we already had carefully considered.”
 
170  Kessler felt so strongly 
about the issue that he had decided to resign in protest if ordered to adopt 
the regulations in the form favored by OMB and USDA.171  Both agencies 
refused to budge, and USDA enlisted the Council on Competitiveness to 
side with its position, which was elevated to the White House for 
decision.172  Kessler writes that “[m]y fate as commissioner and the fate of 
nutrition labeling had become inextricably linked.  If the decision went 
against us, I could not disobey an order from the President.  For me as a 
political appointee, the only response to defeat was to leave.”173
At a White House meeting to resolve the controversy, President Bush 
expressed surprise at the notion that “I’m being told that I can’t just make a 
decision and have it promptly executed, that the Department can’t just 
salute smartly and go execute whatever decision I make.  Why is that?”
 
174  
The reason was that there was no support in the rulemaking record for the 
USDA’s preferred option, and it would have taken a long time to try to 
manufacture a record that would support it.175  Louis Sullivan, the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, ultimately 
persuaded the President by showing him a McDonald’s tray liner with 
nutrition information that was more in line with what FDA wanted.176  
President Bush ultimately ruled in favor of FDA with one minor 
modification concerning restaurants, which the agency implemented.177
In their book on the unitary executive, Calabresi and Yoo argue that in 
my previous scholarship I erroneously characterized Bush’s “I can’t just 
make a decision and have it promptly executed” quotation “as a reflection 
of limitations on the President’s sole authority to execute the law.”
 
178
Bush’s inability to impose OMB’s proposal did not reflect any substantive 
restrictions on the President’s authority to execute the law.  Changes of 
the magnitude proposed by OMB would have to be subjected to the notice 
and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, which 
would delay the decision by at least six to eight weeks and leave the final 
decision to the Clinton administration.
  They 
argue that: 
179
 
 169. See id. at 58–59. 
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 171. Id. at 59. 
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 174. Id. at 68. 
 175. See id. at 68–69. 
 176. See id. at 69. 
 177. See id. at 70–71. 
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 179. Id. at 388–89. 
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Calabresi and Yoo are correct in their reading of Kessler’s memoirs, but 
their apparent agreement that the APA can trump the directive authority that 
they champion for the President is telling.  The APA requires that 
regulatory decisions not be arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law, and 
the underlying regulatory statute here required that the decision be made by 
the FDA Commissioner and not the President.  Moreover, both the agency 
and the President are constrained to make a decision that has sufficient 
support in the rulemaking record, which, as Kessler notes, meant only his 
preferred outcome and not that favored by OMB and USDA because the 
economic interests of the beef industry was not a statutorily relevant factor.  
Thus, in the short run, it made little difference who the President sided with 
in this case because only one of the two proposed outcomes would likely be 
upheld in court.  The fact that Kessler was willing to resign rather than 
accede to a regulatory outcome that would be inconsistent with the law does 
not support the notion that the President has directive authority.  Rather it 
powerfully suggests that Kessler had the integrity not to want to continue to 
work for an administration if it tried to force him to violate the law. 
E.  Regulatory Review During the Clinton Administration 
President Clinton established the regulatory review program that remains 
in effect today when he issued Executive Order 12,866 on September 30, 
1993.180  The most significant feature of the Clinton program is that it made 
regulatory review far more selective than it had been under Presidents 
Reagan and Bush.  Under Executive Order 12,866 only “significant 
regulatory actions” (those estimated to cost more than $100 million per 
year) are subject to review by OMB.181  Clinton’s program also sought to 
prevent OMB from indefinitely delaying agency action by establishing a 
firm ninety-day deadline for completion of OMB review.182  It also 
specified that the Vice President should resolve disputes between agencies 
and OMB.183
Because of its greater selectivity and transparency, Clinton’s regulatory 
review program was far less controversial than those employed by the two 
preceding administrations.
 
184  But President Clinton did not shy away from 
involvement in regulatory decisions.  He greatly expanded the issuance of 
formal presidential directives to executive agencies.  In his two full terms in 
office, President Reagan issued only nine directives to agencies, and 
President George H.W. Bush issued only four during his term—three of 
these instructed agencies to delay or halt the issuance of regulations.185
 
 180. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
  In 
his eight years in office President Clinton issued 107 presidential directives, 
including many directing agencies to take action to address particular 
 181. Id. § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 645. 
 182. See id. § 6(b)(2)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 647. 
 183. Id. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648. 
 184. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 995. 
 185. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2294. 
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problems.186  Only fifteen of these directives were issued in Clinton’s first 
three years in office, but he then averaged more than eighteen directives in 
each of his last five years.187  Rather than focusing exclusively on reducing 
costs to industry, President Clinton frequently directed agencies to take 
actions to strengthen protection of public health, safety, and the 
environment.  Justice Kagan, who was then a professor, described Clinton’s 
actions as a new model of “presidential administration” that she predicted 
would be embraced by future Presidents.188
Although regulatory review is far more selective under Executive Order 
12,866 than under its predecessors, Kagan notes that Clinton’s executive 
order, “unlike the Reagan orders, suggested that the President had authority 
to direct executive department (though not independent agency) heads in 
the exercise of their delegated rulemaking power.”
 
189
[t]o the extent permitted by law, disagreements or conflicts between or 
among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that cannot be 
resolved by the Administrator of OIRA shall be resolved by the President, 
or by the Vice President acting at the request of the President, with the 
relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other interested governmental 
officials).
 This authority is 
contained in section 7 of the executive order, which provides that: 
190
The order provides that, after considering recommendations developed 
within sixty days by the Vice President, this “conflict resolution” process is 
to culminate in notification to the agency and OMB “of the President’s 
decision with respect to the matter.”
 
191  This tracks the process used by the 
George H.W. Bush Administration to resolve the dispute between FDA and 
USDA over the nutrition labeling regulations.  Executive Order 12,866 adds 
new requirements for disclosure of any outside lobbying during this conflict 
resolution process.  Communications during the review period with any 
person not employed by the federal government must be in writing and 
included in the public rulemaking docket.192
However, like the regulatory review executive orders issued by previous 
administrations, Executive Order 12,866 expressly disclaims directive 
authority when Congress has made agency heads responsible for regulatory 
decisions.  In fact, this disclaimer occupies an even more prominent part of 
Executive Order 12,866 where it appears as an entire section—section 9—
instead of being buried in one of nine subsections of section 3, as it was in 
Executive Order 12,291.  Section 9 of Executive Order 12,866 provides:  
“Nothing in this order shall be construed as displacing the agencies’ 
 
 
 186. Id. at 2294–95. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 2317. 
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authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.”193
Kagan does not argue that the Constitution grants directive authority to 
the President.  She notes that  “unlike the unitarians, I acknowledge that 
Congress generally may grant discretion to agency officials alone and that 
when Congress has done so, the President must respect the limits of this 
delegation.”
  Thus, all of the 
executive orders establishing presidential regulatory review programs 
expressly disclaim directive authority. 
194  But she argues that regulatory statutes should be interpreted 
as intending to confer such authority on the President:  “[W]hen Congress 
designates an agency official as a decisionmaker, the President himself may 
step into that official’s shoes.”195  However, a fundamental problem with 
her argument is that the presumption was precisely the opposite when those 
statutes were enacted, which is reflected in the fact that the Reagan, Bush, 
and Clinton executive orders expressly eschewed assertions of such 
authority.196
F.  Regulatory Review During the George W. Bush Administration 
 
President George W. Bush surprised some observers early in his second 
term in office when he signed Executive Order 13,258, which continued the 
regulatory review program adopted by President Clinton’s Executive Order 
12,866 with only one change.  The surprise stemmed from the fact that the 
Clinton Administration’s review program was far more selective than its 
predecessors, even though President George W. Bush was far more 
skeptical of regulation than the Clinton Administration had been.  The one 
change was that Bush transferred the Vice President’s authority to resolve 
disputes between OMB and the agencies to the White House Chief of Staff 
or the Director of OMB.197  In his book Angler:  The Cheney Vice 
Presidency, Barton Gellman reports another surprise—the reason for this 
change.  He notes that “Cheney arrived in office to find a gold mine of 
authority over environmental and other rules,” including the fact that 
Executive Order 12,866 gave the Vice President a role in resolving inter-
agency disputes, adopted by Clinton to enhance Gore’s role in regulatory 
policy.198  Gellman reports that the deletion of the Vice President’s role in 
the executive order was made at Cheney’s request because Cheney wanted 
“the power, but not the public profile.”199  Cheney wanted to direct 
regulatory policy behind the scenes.  “Rather than directing the process 
openly, Cheney interceded through allies at the Office of Management and 
Budget” and “through eager-to-please staffs at Interior, Commerce, Energy, 
and their subagencies” where he had carefully placed his loyalists.200
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Although Cheney had installed his former employee Christine Todd 
Whitman as EPA Administrator, Gellman reports that he ultimately 
precipitated her resignation as a result of two stunning policy shifts that 
undermined her authority.  First, in March 2001 Cheney persuaded 
President Bush to reverse his campaign pledge to control emissions of 
carbon dioxide to combat climate change.  Gellman reports that Cheney 
engineered this stunning policy reversal by carefully excluding EPA and the 
State Department from having any input into the decision and ensuring that 
Bush would sign the confirming document minutes before Whitman and the 
Secretary of State arrived at the White House to protest.201
Gellman reports that the issue that ultimately prompted Whitman’s 
resignation was Cheney’s efforts to force EPA to gut the rules governing 
new source review of powerplants.  The existing rules had been the subject 
of a successful ongoing enforcement campaign started during the final years 
of the Clinton Administration that had upset the utility industry.
 
202  
Gellman quotes Whitman as saying, “I just couldn’t sign” the rule.203  “The 
President has a right to have an administrator who could defend it, and I just 
couldn’t.”204  The rule subsequently was struck down by the D.C. 
Circuit.205
Gellman also reports that Cheney personally spearheaded a successful 
effort to stop the Interior Department from protecting three species of fish 
by reducing the amount of Klamath River water supplied to private 
farmers.
 
206  “In late September 2002, the first of an estimated seventy-seven 
thousand dead salmon began washing up on the banks of the Klamath 
River,” a “kill [that] would not have happened without the diversion of 
water to farms.”207
President Bush’s nomination of Harvard professor John Graham to be 
administrator of OIRA was vigorously opposed by environmental and 
consumer groups who argued that he was too sympathetic to corporate 
interests.
 
208  On July 19, 2001, the Senate confirmed Graham’s 
appointment by a vote of 61–37.209  In an effort to demonstrate that he 
planned to be even-handed in conducting regulatory review, Graham 
announced that OIRA would issue “prompt” letters to agencies to direct 
their attention to issues that deserve greater regulatory attention.210
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September 2001, OIRA sent prompt letters to the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) and to the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS).  The letter to OSHA encouraged the agency to 
require companies to use automated external defibrillators to prevent deaths 
from heart attacks.211  The letter to HHS encouraged it to require food 
labeling that would disclose trans-fatty acid content.212
During the latter part of his second term in office, President George W. 
Bush extended the scope of OMB review.  On January 18, 2007, Bush 
issued Executive Order 13,422, which amended Executive Order 12,866.
 
213  
The new executive order required that each agency’s “regulatory policy 
officer” (RPO), required by Executive Order 12,866, be a presidential 
appointee, and it mandated that OMB review agencies’ “significant 
guidance documents” for the first time.214  The RPOs no longer were to 
report to the head of the agency, but their approval was required before any 
agency rulemaking could be commenced.215  The executive order also 
required agencies to identify in writing the specific market failure or 
problem that warrants a new regulation and to provide their “best estimates” 
of the cumulative regulatory costs and benefits of rules to be issued in the 
next year.216
The George W. Bush Administration was marked by several important 
controversies over White House influence over rulemaking.  Six of these 
controversies are outlined below. 
 
1.  The Congressional Review Act and the OSHA Ergonomics Standard 
On the day the Bush Administration took office, White House Chief of 
Staff Andrew Card, Jr. issued a memorandum to the heads of all executive 
department agencies directing them not to send any proposed or final 
regulations to the Federal Register without the approval of a Bush appointee 
and to withdraw all regulations that had been sent to the Federal Register 
which had not yet been published except for rules dealing with emergency 
situations.217
After an initial effort to block the outgoing Clinton Administration’s 
tighter regulation of arsenic in drinking water created a public furor, the 
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Bush Administration ultimately decided to let the rule take effect.218  
However, President Bush did succeed in killing one significant regulation 
promulgated by the outgoing administration.  In March 2001 President 
Bush enthusiastically signed a joint resolution approved by Congress under 
the fast-track provisions of the Congressional Review Act (CRA)219 to veto 
OSHA’s ergonomics standard, which had been under development by the 
agency for nearly a decade.220  The CRA requires agencies to send all 
regulations to Congress for review sixty days before they take effect, and it 
creates a special fast track procedure to enable Congress to enact joint 
resolutions disapproving regulations.221  If Congress enacts a joint 
resolution of disapproval, the regulation shall not take effect or continue in 
effect, and the agency that issued it is prohibited from issuing any new rule 
that is “substantially the same as” the disapproved rule unless specifically 
authorized by subsequent legislation.222
Using the fast track procedures of the CRA, the joint resolution 
disapproving OSHA’s regulation was adopted without any hearings or 
committee action, with no opportunity for amendments, and with floor 
debate limited to ten hours.
 
223  President Bush endorsed the disapproval 
effort and signed the joint resolution repealing the rule.224  Many of those 
who voted to repeal the rule stated that they were not opposed to having an 
ergonomics standard, but that they objected to the particular standard that 
had been adopted by OSHA.225  Labor Secretary Elaine Chao announced 
that the department would consider a new rule to protect workers from 
repetitive-motion injuries.226
 
 218. See GELLMAN, supra note 
  The regulation’s supporters, however, 
believed that its opponents would use the CRA to preclude OSHA from 
198, at 207. 
 219. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006). 
 220. On March 1, 2001, Congressional Republicans introduced a resolution of 
disapproval, which was approved by the Senate on March 6, 2001 by a vote of 56–44. Pub. 
L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001); 147 CONG. REC. 2682, 2873–74 (2001).  On March 7, the 
U.S. House of Representatives adopted the joint resolution by a vote of 223–206. Id. at 
3037–38.  OSHA had expected that its ergonomics rule would prevent 4.6 million worker 
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injuries. See id. at 68,773. 
 221. See 5 U.S.C. § 802(a). 
 222. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).  In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a legislative veto of regulations is unconstitutional 
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veto. 
 223. See 147 CONG. REC. 2815 (statement of Sen. Trent Lott). 
 224. Statement on Signing Legislation To Repeal Federal Ergonomics Regulations, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 269 (Mar. 20, 2001). 
 225. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. 2828 (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson); id. at 2836 
(statement of Sen. Christopher Bond). 
 226. See id. at 2816 (statement of Sen. James Jeffords). 
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issuing a new ergonomics rule without new legislation specifically 
authorizing it to do so.227
President Bush’s support for using the CRA to veto OSHA’s ergonomics 
standard actually reinforced the notion that the President does not have 
directive authority over regulatory decisions by agencies.  Otherwise, Bush 
simply could have directed OSHA to repeal the standard.  If the President 
has the authority to dictate agency decisions, then it is hard to envision why 
President Clinton would have signed the CRA into law.  If the President 
exerts complete control over agency rulemaking decisions, he would not 
need a special vehicle to expedite repeal of them.  Indeed, the circumstances 
surrounding the repeal of OSHA’s ergonomics regulation—a new 
administration supporting repeal of a rule issued by the outgoing 
administration—probably reflects the already high degree of presidential 
control over rulemaking.  Because the President already has so much 
influence over what agencies do, OSHA’s ergonomics regulation is the only 
regulation that has ever been repealed using the CRA in the quarter century 
of its existence. 
 
2.  The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Controversy 
On December 19, 2007, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson 
unexpectedly denied California’s request for a waiver that would permit the 
state to implement its program to regulate GHG emissions from motor 
vehicles.228  California requested the waiver pursuant to the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) section 209, which provides that the EPA Administrator shall waive 
section 209’s preemption of state law if the Administrator determines that 
the state standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public 
health as applicable federal standards.229  Section 209 stipulates that no 
waiver shall be granted if:  (A) the relevant state regulation is arbitrary and 
capricious or (B) the state does not need the standards to meet “compelling 
and extraordinary conditions.”230
Johnson’s decision to deny the waiver was a clear break from prior 
agency practice, and it defied the EPA career staff’s unanimous 
recommendation to grant at least a partial waiver.
 
231
 
 227. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2); 147 CONG. REC. 2836 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) 
(“If what I think will happen happens when . . . the ergonomics standard is overturned, 
OSHA is barred from introducing any standard that is substantially similar to the rule unless 
specifically authorized by a subsequent act of Congress.  This effectively kills a 10-year 
effort.”). 
  A subsequent 
investigation by the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform revealed that Johnson had supported granting at least a partial 
 228. Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor 
of California (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf. 
 229. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006). 
 230. Id. § 7543(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 231. See Juliet Eilperin, EPA Chief Denies Calif. Limit on Auto Emissions, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 20, 2007, at A1. 
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waiver until shortly before his decision to deny it.232  Johnson abruptly 
changed course after meeting with White House officials, despite the EPA 
career staff’s insistence that the most legally defensible course of action 
would be to grant the waiver.233  The waiver is particularly important 
because at least thirteen states had adopted California’s standards234 and 
several others had pledged to do so.235  Collectively these states represent 
nearly half of the U.S. market for new vehicles.236
Administrator Johnson stated that he denied the waiver because 
California lacked the requisite “compelling and extraordinary conditions” to 
warrant a waiver
 
237 because climate change is a “global problem” that is 
not exclusive to California and thus requires a national solution.238  That 
“national solution” to which Johnson referred ostensibly was the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007,239 which was signed into law 
hours before Johnson denied the waiver.  Johnson claimed that by denying 
the waiver, the Bush Administration was “moving forward with a clear 
national solution, not a confusing patchwork of state rules.”240
In May of 2008, the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform concluded its investigation that revealed that between June and 
December 2007 the EPA staff held several briefings regarding the waiver 
request and in each meeting advised Johnson that the clearest option was to 
grant the waiver.
 
241  A final briefing took place in October 2007 and 
included a presentation that contained the professional opinions of EPA’s 
technical and legal staff.242
 
 232. See EPA’s New Ozone Standards:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter EPA’s New Ozone Standards] 
(statement of Rep. Henry Waxman); id. at 136 (testimony of EPA Administrator Stephen 
Johnson). 
  The EPA staff concluded that the 
circumstances surrounding the waiver were “compelling and 
extraordinary,” and EPA would almost certainly win if it faced a lawsuit for 
 233. Eilperin, supra note 231. 
 234. Memorandum from the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform on the 
EPA’s Denial of the California Waiver (May 19, 2008), 
http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/cleanairact/docs/Waxman-result-5-19-
08.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum].  The states that adopted California’s standards were 
Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New Jersey, New 
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Id. 
 235. Eilperin, supra note 231. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Memorandum, supra note 234. 
 238. Matthew L. Wald, E.P.A. Chief Defends His Decision on California, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 2008, at A19. 
 239. Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 240. Eilperin, supra note 231.  Notably, in the Clean Air Act’s thirty-seven year history, 
EPA had never before denied a waiver to California under section 209. Id.  Since 1970, the 
EPA granted more than fifty waivers involving tailpipe emissions that affected some states 
more than others. John M. Broder & Micheline Maynard, Denial of California Bid on 
Emissions Should Have Been Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at A37. 
 241. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Majority Staff, Memorandum, EPA’s 
Denial of the California Waiver (May 19, 2008), at 6–16, in EPA’s New Ozone Standards, 
supra note 232, at 11, 16–28 [hereinafter Memorandum]. 
 242. Id. at 23–26. 
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granting the waiver and that it could likely lose if it did not.243  The 
Committee’s investigation found substantial evidence to suggest that 
Administrator Johnson supported the waiver, but changed his mind after 
communicating with the White House, despite his staff’s unanimous 
conclusion that a denial of the waiver was likely to be overturned in 
court.244  Johnson refused to reveal his discussions with the White House, 
but he maintained that denial of the waiver was his own decision.245
3.  EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding 
 
As indicated by the California waiver controversy, EPA Administrator 
Steven Johnson was widely considered to be a weak administrator who was 
easily manipulated by OMB and the White House.246
In April 2007 the Supreme Court ruled that EPA was required to 
determine whether GHG emissions endangered public health or welfare 
pursuant to the CAA.
  This also is reflected 
in controversies over whether or not EPA would make an endangerment 
finding for emissions of GHGs and a dispute over EPA’s revisions to 
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone. 
247  After reviewing the scientific data and holding 
multiple inter- and intra-agency meetings, EPA decided to proceed with its 
endangerment report, which it emailed to OMB on December 5, 2007.248  
Minutes later the associate administrator who sent the email received a 
phone call from the White House instructing the agency to retract the email 
and to say that it had been sent in error.249  Johnson refused and said that he 
had approval to issue the draft findings.250  Johnson also refused to 
withdraw the document when later asked to say that it could become moot 
as a result of energy legislation moving through Congress.251
 
 243. Memorandum, supra note 
  OMB then 
241, at 23.  An earlier version of the slide contained 
“much stronger language” regarding the litigation outcome should EPA deny the waiver. Id. 
at 23–24.  Multiple witnesses testifying before the House committee investigating EPA’s 
denial of the waiver request confirmed that Administrator Johnson was made aware of the 
waiver criteria and legal risks that would come with a denial.  Id. at 24–26.   
 244. See id. at 12. 
 245. EPA’s New Ozone Standards, supra note 232, at 137 (testimony of EPA 
Administrator Stephen Johnson). 
 246. See Bush Leaves Weak Environmental Legacy, Ex-EPA Officials Say, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/
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leadership,’ said Russell Train, EPA administrator during the Nixon and Ford eras.  ‘EPA 
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 247. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007). 
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WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A2. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Letter from EPA Administrator Stephen L. Johnson to President George W. 
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decided simply never to open the email because it would start the review 
process and eventually result in the document becoming public.252
On January 31, 2008, Johnson sent a letter to President Bush stating that 
in light of the latest scientific evidence, EPA was required to respond to the 
Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA ruling by proposing a positive 
endangerment finding for GHG emissions under the CAA.  Johnson’s letter, 
which was revealed by Congressman Henry Waxman in February 2011, 
stated: 
 
[Massachusetts v. EPA] combined with the latest science of climate 
change requires the Agency to propose a positive endangerment finding, 
as was agreed to at the Cabinet-level meeting in November . . . .  [T]he 
state of the latest climate change science does not permit a negative 
finding, nor does it permit a credible finding that we need to wait for more 
research.253
The letter then refers to a “prudent and cautious yet forward thinking” plan 
that will meet EPA’s legal obligations in response to several lawsuits.
 
254  
While noting that “I welcome your guidance as we move forward,” Johnson 
stated that “[a]fter careful and sometime[s] difficult deliberation, I have 
concluded that it is in the Administration’s best interest to move forward 
with this plan in the next few weeks.”255  In an appendix marked 
“Privileged Communication to the President,” Johnson outlined an “EPA 
Climate Change Plan” that included issuance of a proposed positive 
endangerment finding for public notice and comment in March or April 
2008 and finalizing it by the end of 2008.256  Johnson’s plan reportedly was 
blocked by OMB, which required the agency to strip out the endangerment 
finding from its proposal.257  Finally on July 11, 2008, EPA issued an 
advance notice of proposed rulemaking, which asked for public comment 
on whether or not GHG emissions pose any danger.258
4.  National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Ozone 
 
EPA also ran into OMB interference when it finally reviewed the 
NAAQS for ozone.  On February 22, 2008, EPA submitted its draft final 
 
 252. Felicity Barringer, White House Refused To Open E-Mail on Pollutants, N.Y. TIMES, 
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 253. Letter, supra note 250. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
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110TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO MASSACHUSETTS 
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 258. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air 
Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008). 
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regulation to OMB.259  EPA’s draft would tighten the primary standard to 
seventy-five parts per billion (ppb) and adopt a secondary standard of 
seventy ppb.260  Two weeks later OIRA Administrator Susan Dudley 
objected to EPA’s decision to adopt different primary and secondary 
NAAQS for ozone for the first time.261  EPA was under a deadline to 
finalize the standard by March 12, 2008.262
Administrator Johnson had scheduled a 1:00 p.m. press conference that 
day to announce the new standard.
 
263  Shortly before the press conference, 
Dudley informed Johnson that President Bush “has concluded that, 
consistent with Administration policy, added protection should be afforded 
to public welfare by strengthening the secondary ozone standard and setting 
it to be identical to the new primary standard” at seventy-five ppb.264  
Johnson then postponed the press conference to 6:00 p.m. when he 
announced the standards dictated by OMB.265  John Walke, an attorney for 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, denounced the decision, claiming 
that it was “unprecedented and an unlawful act of political interference for 
the President personally to override a decision that the Clean Air Act leaves 
exclusively to EPA’s expert scientific judgment.”266
5.  The FDA and “Plan B” 
 
For several years the Bush Administration was embroiled in controversy 
over whether the FDA should approve Plan B, an emergency contraceptive, 
for non-prescription use.  FDA was caught between intense pressure from 
the White House not to approve the request and pressure from members of 
Congress who blocked confirmation of two nominees for FDA 
Commissioner until they promised at least to make a decision.267  When 
FDA finally acted to deny non-prescription use of the drug for women 
under the age of eighteen, its decision was challenged by the Center for 
Reproductive Rights in Tummino v. Torti.268
Plaintiffs who sued FDA were able to explore the unusual 
decisionmaking procedure it employed when it decided to continue to 
require prescriptions for women under eighteen who wished to use Plan B.  
Discovery revealed that in a Commissioner’s meeting concerning the switch 
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application, the discussion among Deputy Commissioner Dr. Lester 
Crawford and review staff turned to the “political sensitivity” of the 
switch.269  Moreover, Commissioner Dr. Mark McClellan discussed the 
application with Jay Lefkowitz, the Deputy Assistant to the President for 
Domestic Policy, and provided updates on the application to White House 
staff.270  According to the testimony of FDA senior staff members, political 
and ideological factors also played a determinative role in the nomination 
and selection of Advisory Committee for Reproductive Health Drugs 
(ACRHD) members.271  Many individuals appointed by the Commissioner 
to the Committee were inexperienced and underqualified.272  These 
members were selected not for their qualifications but to reach what the 
Office of the Commissioner referred to as a “balance of opinion” on the 
ACRHD, thus stacking the committee with individuals who were active in 
Right to Life antiabortion causes.273
Plan B’s sponsor reported its actual use study data to the FDA, showing 
that “the frequency of unprotected sex did not increase, condom use did not 
decrease, and the overall use of effective contraception did not 
decrease.”
 
274  In light of these results, the Advisory Committee voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of approving Plan B for over the counter (OTC) 
use without age or point-of-sale restrictions.275  Though the FDA had 
followed the Advisory Committee in every OTC switch decision between 
1994 and 2004, it denied the Plan B switch request.276  Testimony of FDA 
officials showed that Dr. McClellan, the Acting Deputy Commissioner, did 
not make the decision on his own.  The White House had made it clear to 
him that an OTC Plan B would be politically unpopular and that the public 
“needed to have the message that we were taking adolescents and 
reproductive issues seriously.”277  Dr. Houn, the director of the FDA office 
that evaluated Plan B, testified that Dr. Janet Woodcock told her that a 
denial was necessary “to appease the [present] administration’s 
constituents,” and then later this could be approved.278  Under political 
pressure from the White House, the FDA in May 2004 issued a non-
approvable letter for Plan B, citing the lack of age restrictions.279
 
 269. Id. at 527. 
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 275. Id.  The committee voted twenty-three to four in favor of a recommendation to 
approve Plan B for over-the-counter (OTC) status without age or point-of-sale restrictions. 
Id.  It also voted unanimously in favor of finding that Plan B is safe for OTC use and by a 
vote of twenty-seven to one that the actual use study data could be generalized to the total 
population of OTC Plan B users. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 529. 
 278. Id. at 530 (alterations in original). 
 279. There was also evidence that Dr. McClellan made the decision before FDA staff had 
even completed its scientific reviews of the actual use data. Id. 
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Shortly after the first supplemental new drug application was denied, the 
Plan B sponsor amended its request to seek OTC sale of Plan B to women 
sixteen and older who presented a valid identification to the pharmacist, and 
prescription-only sales for women fifteen and younger.280  Although many 
FDA scientists found the age restriction to be unwarranted, the FDA 
delayed its decision beyond the normal 180-day time frame.281  Acting 
Commissioner Crawford had removed Dr. Steven Galson’s authority to 
make the switch decision, effectively freezing the review process for over 
seven months.282  In light of the FDA’s handling of the Plan B switch 
application, Dr. Susan Wood, the Assistant Commissioner and Director of 
the FDA Office of Women’s Health, resigned, as did Dr. Frank Davidoff, a 
member of the FDA’s Non-Prescription Drug Advisory Committee.283  On 
August 24, 2006, the FDA approved non-prescription use of Plan B only for 
women eighteen and older.284
An investigation by the Government Accountability Office found four 
irregularities in the agency’s decision process.
 
285  First, the Directors of the 
Offices of Drug Evaluation, who are normally responsible for deciding on 
the application, disagreed with the decision and refused to sign the non-
approval letter.286  Second, FDA’s senior leadership was heavily involved 
in the process, which was unusual for switch applications.287  Third, it was 
unclear whether the decision was made before or after the reviews of the 
application were completed; high-level management told the reviewing 
bodies that the application would be denied before reviews were 
complete.288  Fourth, the rationale for the decision—concern for adolescents 
engaging in unsafe sexual behavior—was unusual because behavioral 
factors normally are not considered in switch decisions.289
In March 2009, Judge Edward R. Korman of the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.  The judge 
concluded that the “FDA’s decision was not the result of good faith and 
reasoned agency decision-making.”
 
290  He cited “repeated and unreasonable 
delays, pressure emanating from the White House, and the obvious 
connection between the confirmation process of two FDA Commissioners 
and the timing of the FDA’s decisions.”291
 
 280. Id. at 531. 
  The court also found that the 
FDA departed significantly from its normal procedures for switch 
applications and did so for implausible reasons and without sufficient 
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evidence to support its decision.292  The court concluded that the “FDA 
simply has not come forward with an adequate explanation [for the 
departure], nor has it presented any evidence to rebut plaintiffs’ showing 
that it acted in bad faith and in response to political pressure.”293  Declaring 
that the record was so clear on one issue, the court took the unusual step of 
ordering the agency to make Plan B available without prescription to 
women seventeen and older.  It remanded the rest of the case and ordered 
FDA to reconsider whether any age restrictions on non-prescription use are 
appropriate.294
6.  The Justice Department and Domestic Surveillance 
 
Another incident from the Bush Administration that subsequently has 
come to light illustrates the power of agency officials who threaten to resign 
when they believe the White House is asking them to do something illegal 
or improper.  In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
President Bush signed a secret order in 2002 that authorized the National 
Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on 
United States citizens and foreign nationals in the United States.295  The 
order allowed NSA to gather signals intelligence from communications 
involving U.S. citizens without first obtaining a warrant or court order.296  
The White House’s purported basis for this surveillance program was the 
President’s power to authorize the use of “‘all necessary and appropriate 
force’” to engage with those responsible for the September 11 attacks,297 
which required that NSA not wait to obtain warrants at the risk of losing 
vital information.298  Every forty-five days the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
had to review the program to ensure its legality, and, if the DOJ certified 
the program, the President had to sign an order to renew it.299  When the 
program was reviewed beginning in late 2003, the review process dragged 
beyond the forty-five-day timeline as the White House battled with cabinet 
members and top DOJ officials over the program’s legality.300
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Bush renewed the program on March 11, 2004, but less than one week later 
he retracted his renewal and permitted the DOJ to amend the program.301  
President Bush changed course when he realized that by renewing the 
program without DOJ certification he would face mass resignations of 
officials in the upper echelon of his Administration.302
Vice President Dick Cheney played the leading role in the execution of 
the program from the start.  Cheney chaired surveillance program briefings 
for select members of Congress while his counsel, David Addington, 
drafted the original authorization letter signed by President Bush.
 
303  
Addington worked with Cheney in an effort to persuade DOJ officials to 
certify the legality of the program.304  When Cheney briefed members of 
Congress on the program, he reassured them that the NSA’s top law and 
ethics officers approved of the program.305  In reality, Joel Brenner, NSA’s 
inspector general, and Vito Potenza, NSA’s acting general counsel, were 
simply acting in reliance on the renewal orders certified by the Attorney 
General and signed by President Bush, not on their own independent 
analysis of the legality of the program.306  Meanwhile, Jack L. Goldsmith, 
the Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
and one of the few officials who had been briefed on the program,307 
warned of major legal problems throughout the surveillance program’s 
review process.308
Upon reviewing the surveillance program, Goldsmith determined that it 
was “the biggest legal mess” he had ever seen in his life.
 
309  Goldsmith 
wanted Deputy Attorney General James Comey to be consulted about the 
program as well, and Addington and White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales reluctantly agreed on the condition that Goldsmith give his 
definitive answer on the program’s legality by the March 11, 2004 
deadline.310  Goldsmith and Patrick Philbin, an OLC lawyer, began 
working on bringing the program into compliance with the law, but 
concluded that certain parts of the program had no legal support.311  Comey 
then met with Scott Muller, General Counsel at the CIA, who agreed with 
Goldsmith and Philbin’s conclusions.312
 
 301. Id. at 313–26. 
  On March 4, Comey presented the 
findings to Attorney General John Ashcroft, who said that he would not 
sign the order to renew the surveillance program unless the White House 
 302. Id. at 319–21. 
 303. Id. at 143, 153–54, 279. 
 304. Id. at 282–98. 
 305. Gellman, supra note 299. 
 306. Id.  In fact, neither official had even seen the DOJ’s classified legal analysis 
authored by Yoo. See GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 277–81. 
 307. Gellman, supra note 299.  Addington briefed Goldsmith on the program shortly after 
he took his post in DOJ in October 2003.  Id. 
 308. Barton Gellman, Cheney Shielded Bush from Crisis, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at 
A1. 
 309. Gellman, supra note 299. 
 310. Id. 
 311. See GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 289–94. 
 312. Id. at 293. 
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agreed to significant changes in it.313  The next day, Ashcroft entered the 
hospital for treatment of acute gallstone pancreatitis, and Comey became 
the Acting Attorney General.314
On March 6, Goldsmith informed Gonzales and Addington that DOJ 
would not certify the program.
 
315  Two days before the program was set to 
expire Cheney still had yet to inform President Bush about the brewing 
controversy.316  Gonzalez made one last effort to convince Goldsmith to 
reconsider, but Goldsmith refused.317  That evening, Cheney convened a 
meeting at which he and Addington attempted once more to persuade 
Comey and Goldsmith to certify the program, but Comey refused to certify 
it, despite its importance, because it lacked legal support.318
On March 10, the day before the surveillance program was set to expire, 
officials engaged in both sides of the battle made their final moves.  Comey 
checked to see whether Frances Fragos Townsend, President Bush’s deputy 
National Security Advisor for combating terrorism, was briefed on the 
program and learned, to his surprise, that she was not.
 
319  Other notable 
officials left out of the loop were Homeland Security Advisor John Gordon, 
Deputy National Security Advisor Steven J. Hadley, Homeland Security 
Secretary Tom Ridge,320 and Bush’s chief political advisor Karl Rove.321  
Cheney convened a meeting attended by Hayden, Gonzales, four ranking 
members of the House, four ranking members of the Senate, and chairmen 
and vice chairmen of intelligence committees.322  Gonzales later testified 
that there was a “consensus in the room” to push forward with the 
surveillance program, but this statement was disputed by participants from 
both parties, and Goldsmith and Comey refused to certify the program.323  
White House officials made a last-ditch effort to secure the DOJ’s 
certification.  With less than twenty-four hours before the surveillance 
program was to expire, Gonzales and Card raced to George Washington 
University Medical Center in an effort to obtain Ashcroft’s signature.324
 
 313. Id. 
  
Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin rushed to the hospital as well, arriving 
before the White House officials.  Ashcroft managed to sit up and not only 
refused to sign the certification—he also told Gonzales and Card that he 
 314. Gellman, supra note 299. 
 315. Id. 
 316. GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 296. 
 317. Id. at 294. 
 318. Gellman, supra note 299.  Also in attendance at the meeting were Andrew Card, 
NSA Director Mike Hayden, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, and John McLaughlin of the 
CIA. Id. 
 319. Id.  Comey made this determination by asking Townsend whether she recognized the 
classified code name of the program; she did not. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Gellman, supra note 308.  Although National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
had clearance, Cheney did not invite her to significant meetings. Id. 
 322. Id.  President Bush was not involved at this point in time. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
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“never should have certified the [surveillance] program in the first 
place.”325
By this point, Goldsmith and Comey had resolved to resign should the 
President renew the program without DOJ certification, and several other 
high-ranking officials were reportedly prepared to follow suit.
 
326  Several 
lawyers would leave DOJ if Comey quit;327 FBI General Counsel Valerie 
Caproni and the CIA General Counsel Scott Mueller told colleagues that 
they would resign if the program were reauthorized; and Assistant Attorney 
General Christopher Wray said that he would resign if Comey resigned.328  
Even Ashcroft was prepared to resign.329  But President Bush, away on the 
campaign trail, was unaware of the impending mass resignations.330
Addington reached a “solution” to the threat to the surveillance 
program’s survival by editing the March 11 renewal order so that in place 
of the Attorney General’s signature line there was a line for Alberto 
Gonzales’s signature.
 
331  This switch in authorization essentially allowed 
the President to rely on his own authority to certify the program as lawful.  
President Bush signed the order but did agree, at Condoleezza Rice’s 
recommendation, to meet with Comey to discuss the controversy.  President 
Bush expressed concern that Comey was “raising this at the last minute,” 
signaling that he had not been informed of the resignation plans or that 
Comey and others had been voicing their objections to the surveillance 
program for months.332
 
 325. Id.  Ashcroft further stated that the White House officials “drew the circle so tight” 
that he could not receive the advice that he needed. Id. 
  It was clear that the White House would have to 
 326. Id.  Both men drafted resignation letters.  Goldsmith instructed his deputy, Ed 
Whelan, to draft his resignation letter immediately after the hospital meeting. GELLMAN, 
supra note 198, at 305.  Comey reiterated in his resignation letter that he had promised at his 
confirmation hearing that he “would never be a part of something that [he] believe[d] to be 
fundamentally wrong” and that the DOJ had been unable to right the wrong in this case. Id. 
at 313–14.  Thus, he must “do the right thing” and resign. Letter from James B. Comey, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., to President George W. Bush (Mar. 16, 2004) (unsent), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/cheney/doc-comey-resig.html. 
 327. Comey testified that he believed that a large portion of his staff was set to resign. 
Written Questions from Sen. Charles E. Schumer to James B. Comey 1 (May 15, 2007), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/cheney/doc-
comey-senate.html [hereinafter Questions]. 
 328. Gellman, supra note 308.  Caproni was bound by the FBI’s central mission—to 
“uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States,” which she could not do if she 
were to enforce a program that the DOJ refused to certify as legal. Gellman, supra note 299. 
 329. Eggen & Kane, supra note 295. 
 330. Gellman, supra note 308.  Cheney, Addington, Card, and Gonzales were all aware of 
the potential resignations.  Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id.  Mueller also met privately with the President and informed him that the FBI 
could not participate in operations that DOJ deemed to be criminal violations of the law, so 
he would be forced to resign. Id.  Moreover, Comey later testified that DOJ’s views on the 
legality of the surveillance program, including the view that neither Comey nor Ashcroft 
would certify the program, were communicated orally and in writing in the weeks or months 
preceding the March 10 meeting. Written Questions to Former Deputy Att’y Gen. James B. 
Comey Submitted by Sen. Patrick Leahy 2 (May 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/cheney/doc-comey-senate.html. 
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backtrack in order to avoid a mass resignation and a certain political 
scandal. 
One week after signing the order renewing the surveillance program, 
President Bush amended the directive by placing legal certification 
authority back on the DOJ and telling Comey “to do what [the DOJ] thinks 
needs to be done.”333  Much of the program remained the same,334 though 
Comey refused to specify whether the program was the same after 2004 and 
what, if any, changes had been made.335  Despite the President’s 
backtracking, as of 2007 Gonzales continued to defend the program the 
DOJ refused to certify.336
G.  Regulatory Review and Presidential Directives Under President Obama 
 
1.  Regulatory Review During the Obama Administration 
From the first days of his Administration, President Barack Obama made 
it clear that he would play an active role in seeking to mobilize the federal 
bureaucracy to achieve his policy ends.  Moving swiftly to reverse certain 
Bush Administration policies, on his first full day in office he revoked 
Executive Order 13,233, which the Bush Administration had used to block 
the release of presidential records.337  Nine days later, he revoked the two 
executive orders President Bush had issued to modify the Clinton 
Administration’s regulatory review program,338 and he announced that he 
would develop a new regulatory review program after requesting public 
comment on how a new executive order should structure the process.339
Obama endorsed the concept of presidential review of agency action:  
“While recognizing the expertise and authority of executive branch 
departments and agencies, I also believe that, if properly conducted, 
centralized review is both legitimate and appropriate as a means of 
promoting regulatory goals.”
 
340
 
 333. Gellman, supra note 
  The President requested his OMB 
Director, “in consultation with representatives of regulatory agencies, as 
308.  President Bush sent this message to Comey through 
Mueller. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Questions, supra note 327, at 1. 
 336. Eggen & Kane, supra note 295. 
 337. Exec. Order No. 13,489, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 191, 193 (2010).  For a discussion of 
Executive Order 13,233 see Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 1012–13. 
 338. Exec. Order No. 13,497, §§ 1–2, 3 C.F.R. 218, 218 (2010) (revoking Exec. Order 
13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008), and Exec. Order 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003)); see supra notes 
197, 213–15 and accompanying text (detailing how Executive Orders 13,258 and 13,422 
modified Executive Order 13,233).  Curiously, on March 4, 2009, OMB Director Peter R. 
Orszag issued a memorandum “clarifying” that the President did not intend to revoke 
OIRA’s authority to review guidance documents. Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. 
&  Budget, Memorandum for the Heads & Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Mar. 
4, 2009) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).  He based this claim on the assertion that 
OMB occasionally had reviewed agency guidance documents prior to the issuance of 
Executive Order 13,422. Id. 
 339. Barack H. Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 
30, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009). 
 340. Id. 
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appropriate, to produce within 100 days a set of recommendations for a new 
Executive Order on Federal regulatory review.”341
On February 26, 2009, OMB published a request for “public comments 
on how to improve the process and principles governing regulation.”
 
342
• The relationship between OIRA and the agencies; 
  
Comments particularly were solicited on: 
• Disclosure and transparency; 
• Encouraging public participation in agency regulatory processes; 
• The role of cost-benefit analysis; 
• The role of distributional considerations, fairness, and concern 
for the interests of future generations; 
• Methods of ensuring that regulatory review does not produce 
undue delay; 
• The role of the behavioral sciences in formulating regulatory 
policy; and 
• The best tools for achieving public goals through the regulatory 
process.343
The public comment request emphasized that executive orders are not 
subject to the notice and comment procedures of the APA, but it stated that 
public comment was useful due to the “unusually high level of public 
interest.”
 
344
The public comment request resulted in 183 comments from academia, 
trade interest groups, public policy and interest groups, and private 
citizens.
 
345
While many observers expected the Obama Administration to move 
quickly to establish its own regulatory review program, it was not until 
January 18, 2011 that the President issued Executive Order 13,563.
  Comments received from the agencies were not made public. 
346  The 
executive order leaves all the elements of the Clinton regulatory review 
program largely intact, while modifying it to give priority also to weeding 
out obsolete regulations and to improving existing rules that are insufficient 
to achieve regulatory objectives.347
 
 341. Id. 
  Among the significant themes 
embedded in the new executive order are the value of learning from prior 
experience with regulatory policy; the importance of adopting an even-
 342. Office of Management and Budget, Federal Regulatory Review—Request for 
Comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (Feb. 26, 2009). 
 343. Id. at 8819. 
 344. Id. 
 345. See Public Comments on OMB Recommendations for a New Executive Order on 
Regulatory Review, REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/
publicComments.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 346. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 347. Id. § 6, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3822; see Barack Obama, Opinion, Toward a 21st-Century 
Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17 (stating that the administration is 
“making it our mission to root out regulations that conflict, that are not worth the cost, or 
that are just plain dumb”). 
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handed, results-oriented approach to regulation; and the value of flexibility 
in approaches to regulations, embracing default rules, warnings and 
informational strategies.348  Equity, dignity, fairness, and the distributional 
consequences of regulation are identified as important considerations to 
supplement evaluations of regulatory costs and benefits.349
On the question of presidential directive authority, the Obama executive 
order disclaims authority to displace decision making entrusted by statute to 
agency heads.  Section 7(b) of the executive order specifies that “[n]othing 
in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:  (i) authority 
granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof.”
 
350
2.  Presidential Directives During the Obama Administration 
  Thus, 
President Obama continues the tradition of eschewing directive authority in 
the executive order outlining his regulatory review program. 
From the first days of his Administration, President Obama issued 
directives to agencies asking them to reconsider Bush Administration 
policies.  Six days after taking office, President Obama signaled that he 
intended to effect significant changes in the nation’s environmental 
policies.  On January 26, 2009, Obama issued separate memoranda to the 
EPA Administrator351 and to both the Secretary of Transportation and the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
Administrator.352  These memoranda directed both the EPA Administrator 
to reconsider former Administrator Johnson’s decision to deny California a 
waiver to set statewide GHG emissions standards for new motor vehicles353 
and the Secretary of Transportation and NHTSA Administrator to 
promulgate stronger fuel efficiency standards under the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act.354  Both memoranda served as significant 
reversals of Bush Administration policies.355
In his first two years in office, President Obama issued seventy-four 
Executive Orders.
 
356
 
 348. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 4, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3822. 
  Other Obama directives also addressed energy and 
environmental issues.  On February 5, 2009, President Obama asked the 
Department of Energy to enact higher appliance efficiency standards under 
the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the 2005 Energy Policy 
 349. Id. § 1, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3821. 
 350. Id. § 7(b), 76 Fed. Reg. at 3822. 
 351. Memorandum, supra note 234. 
 352. Barack Obama, Memorandum, The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(Jan. 26, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4907 (Jan. 28, 2009). 
 353. Memorandum, supra note 234, at 20. 
 354. Obama, supra note 352. 
 355. Obama Moves To Revise Fuel Efficiency Policies, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 26, 2009, 
1:20 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/environment/jan-june09/fuel_01-26.html. 
 356. Barack Obama Executive Orders Disposition Tables, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/obama.html (last visited Apr. 20, 
2011). 
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Act.357  On March 3, 2009, the President again acted to reverse Bush 
Administration policy,358 requesting federal agencies to resume full 
scientific review of activities that could harm endangered species.359  
President Obama also directed agencies to shield government scientific 
research from political influence.360  He created a working group to design 
biofuel policy while asking the Secretary of Agriculture to develop 
investment mechanisms for biofuels.361  In June 2009 the President issued a 
memorandum creating a taskforce aimed at designing and implementing 
comprehensive national policy to protect oceans, coasts, and the Great 
Lakes.362
On October 5, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,514, 
which requires federal agencies to set targets to control their greenhouse gas 
emissions.
 
363  The Order also directs agencies to increase energy efficiency, 
reduce waste, conserve water, reduce fleet petroleum consumption, support 
sustainable communities, and utilize government purchasing power to 
support environmentally friendly products.364  In response to the 
catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the President issued a 
memorandum to improve fuel efficiency365 and also issued an executive 
order establishing the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.366  The memorandum ordered federal 
agencies to develop fuel economy and emissions standards for medium and 
heavy-duty trucks for model years 2014–18,367 the first ever efficiency 
targets for these classes of trucks.368  The memorandum also called for 
another round of fuel efficiency and emissions targets for passenger cars 
and light-duty trucks starting in 2017.369
 
 357. Barack Obama, Memorandum, Appliance Efficiency Standards (Feb. 5, 2009), 74 
Fed. Reg. 6537 (Feb. 9, 2009). 
  Executive Order 13,543 
established the President’s oil spill commission and directed it to analyze 
 358. Reversing Bush Rule, Obama Resumes Safeguards for Endangered Species, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 3, 2009, 5:05 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/science/jan-
june09/speciesrule_03-03.html. 
 359. Barack Obama, Memorandum, The Endangered Species Act (Mar. 3, 2009), 74 Fed. 
Reg. 9753 (Mar. 6, 2009). 
 360. Barack Obama, Memorandum, Scientific Integrity (Mar. 9, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 
10,671 (Mar. 11, 2009). 
 361. Id. 
 362. Barack Obama, Memorandum, National Policy for the Oceans, Our Coasts, and the 
Great Lakes (June 12, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 28,591 (June 17, 2009). 
 363. Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 248, 249 (2010). 
 364. Id. 
 365. Barack Obama, Memorandum, Improving Energy Security, American 
Competitiveness and Job Creation, and Environmental Protection Through a Transformation 
of Our Nation’s Fleet of Cars and Trucks (May 21, 2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 29,399 (May 26, 
2010). 
 366. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 26, 2010). 
 367. Obama, supra note 365, § 1; U.S. Sets Sights on Auto Fuel Efficiency for 2017, 
REUTERS (May 21, 2010, 11:46 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/21/us-autos-
fuel-idUSTRE64J75120100521. 
 368. U.S. Sets Sights on Auto Fuel Efficiency for 2017, supra note 367. 
 369. Obama, supra note 365. 
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the causes of the oil spill and to develop policies to prevent future spills 
from offshore drilling.370
President Obama also employed a large number of advisors with 
responsibility for coordinating certain policy areas.  Responding to charges 
that these “czars,” who are not subject to Senate confirmation, had too 
much authority, the White House argued that they are not intended to 
“supplant or replace” responsibilities delegated by law to executive 
agencies.  Instead, their duties are to “help coordinate” agency efforts and to 
assist in devising “comprehensive solutions to complex problems.”
 
371
IV.  DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Arguments that presidential directive authority is constitutionally 
mandated are unconvincing,372 as even the most ardent proponents of the 
unitary executive must acknowledge.373  Calabresi and Yoo’s efforts to 
uncover historical roots for directive authority collide with a historical 
record that is almost entirely to the contrary.  They claim that “[p]erhaps the 
most dramatic assertion” of directive authority is the establishment of 
presidential programs requiring OMB review of budgetary and regulatory 
initiatives.374  Yet, as discussed above, each of the executive orders issued 
over the last thirty years to establish a new program of presidential 
oversight of agency action has expressly disclaimed directive authority.375
In subsequent work Calabresi and Yoo maintain that their book 
“probably [does] not pay sufficient attention” to President Clinton’s 
  
This powerfully undermines not only the argument that presidential practice 
supports directive authority as a constitutional imperative but also the 
suggestion that statutes granting agency heads regulatory authority should 
be interpreted to reflect implicit congressional intent to give the President 
directive authority. 
 
 370. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397. 
 371. Letter from Gregory B. Craig, Counsel to the President, to Senator Russell D. 
Feingold 3 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/feingoldletter.pdf. 
 372. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those 
Who Would Distort and Abuse It:  A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. 
Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593 (2010); Peter L. Strauss, 
Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
696 (2007). 
 373. Christopher S. Yoo, Symposium, Presidential Power in Historical Perspective:  
Reflections on Calabresi and Yoo’s The Unitary Executive—Foreword, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 241, 246 (2010) (“Several commentators have observed that our book offers a stronger 
showing of presidential assertions of the power to remove executive officials and a weaker 
showing of the President’s authority to direct executive officials in their actions.”). 
 374. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 421.  Moreover, all of the other examples they 
cite of Presidents directing subordinates occurred long before the dawn of the regulatory 
state when statutes routinely specified that regulatory decisions were to be made by agency 
heads. 
 375. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 7(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011); 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(3), 3 
C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982). 
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expanded use of presidential directives, as outlined by Elena Kagan.376  
These instances are discussed below, but it is worth noting for now that 
Kagan herself concedes that any directive authority allegedly asserted by 
President Clinton was not derived from the Constitution.377  At best, 
Calabresi and Yoo’s history suggests that nearly all Presidents have tried to 
influence regulatory decisions by executive agencies, indicating perhaps 
that they would like to have directive authority, but that is a far cry from 
establishing that the President actually has directive authority, or even that 
any President genuinely believed that the Constitution mandates it.378  
Given that the Constitution says so little about executive agencies, leaving 
it largely to Congress to fill in the details, it is not surprising that the unitary 
executive theory has been overwhelmingly rejected by scholars, particularly 
since the actions of the first Congress are at odds with it.379
Proponents of the unitary executive theory also claim that because the 
President has authority to remove executive officers at will, it makes little 
or no difference whether the President has directive authority because he 
can remove any officer who resists his direction.  Yet the historical record 
demonstrates that, despite the President’s broad removal authority, the 
answer to the separate directive authority question matters greatly.  It 
determines whether agency heads have a legal entitlement to refuse to 
comply with a presidential directive when it directs them to act in a way 
they believe is illegal, improper, or unwise.  The historical record 
powerfully supports the notion that the absence of directive authority 
provides an important check on potentially egregious abuses of presidential 
power.  Even if the President’s removal authority enables him to fire the 
heads of executive agencies at will, requiring him to fire a resistant officer 
and replace him with an officer who will take the action he desires 
invariably has substantial political costs. 
 
Directive authority to override Congress’s choice of regulatory decision 
maker also would undermine the U.S. Senate’s advice and consent power 
over the confirmation of agency heads, an important constitutional 
qualification on the President’s appointment power established by Article 
II, Section 2 of the Constitution.  The process of confirmation of agency 
heads now frequently is used to obtain assurances that presidential 
nominees will implement their statutory responsibilities with some degree 
of independence from the President’s political preferences.380
 
 376. See Yoo, supra note 
  If the 
373, at 246–47. 
 377. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2251, 2320. 
 378. Mark Tushnet suggests that theories of the unitary executive have evolved 
historically in three stages that correspond remarkably to the desires of whatever 
administration is in power. Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the 
Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313 (2010). 
 379. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 975–76 (discussing how the 
first Congress “even while acknowledging the President’s broad executive powers, . . . 
entrusted agency heads with certain decisionmaking responsibilities, and . . . sought to 
preserve some independence for agency heads in their performance of those 
responsibilities”). 
 380. See id. at 1005–06. 
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President had directive authority over decisions entrusted by statute to 
agency heads, it would make little difference whether he appointed officials 
acceptable to the Senate because he always could override their judgments. 
As discussed in the historical update above, time after time when White 
House officials tried to persuade agency heads to make decisions for 
reasons that deviated from statutory commands, agency heads have resisted.  
From White House requests for EPA to drop its first enforcement actions 
against Republican campaign contributors381 to orders seeking to 
countermand climate science,382 the absence of directive authority has 
afforded the moral high ground to agency officials who are willing take a 
stand when the White House crosses the line.  This is well demonstrated by 
the refusal of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney 
General William Ruckelshaus to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox 
when President Nixon was trying to avoid further inquiry into the 
Watergate scandal.383  Most recently, the threat of mass resignations by top 
Bush Administration officials over the President’s domestic surveillance 
program forced the administration to make substantial modifications in the 
program.384
To be sure, the absence of presidential directive authority does not mean 
that the President is unlikely to prevail when he disagrees with agency 
heads over regulatory policy matters.  At will removal authority is a 
powerful tool that dictates that few agency heads will defy the President.  
But this means that such defiance will only occur when it is a matter so 
essential that it rises to the level of importance that former FDA 
Commissioner David Kessler dubbed a “resignable” event.
 
385
Given the President’s removal power, agency heads frequently agree to 
comply voluntarily with White House directives, even if the President does 
not have directive authority.  Because agency decisions must be consistent 
with the underlying regulatory statutes and supported by evidence in the 
administrative record, if the White House dictates a result that is 
inconsistent with the regulatory statute or the rulemaking record, the 
decision is vulnerable to being overturned in court, as occurred in Public 
Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson
 
386 and in New York v. Reilly.387
As discussed above, there are strong reasons to believe that EPA 
Administrator Stephen Johnson dutifully complied with numerous White 
  If 
the agency head is willing to embrace the decision as his or her own, the 
fact that the decision was the product of OMB or, in a rare case, presidential 
persuasion is unlikely to affect its chances of surviving judicial review. 
 
 381. See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
 382. See supra notes 228–66 and accompanying text. 
 383. See the discussion of the “Saturday Night Massacre” in Percival, Presidential 
Management, supra note 2, at 1004. 
 384. See text accompanying notes 295–330, supra. 
 385. KESSLER, supra note 168, at 69. 
 386. 796 F.2d 1479, 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing and remanding decision by 
OSHA’s head to carry out OMB’s last-minute directive to delete short-term exposure limit 
for ethylene oxide without any support or explanation in the administrative record). 
 387. 969 F.2d 1147, 1148–50 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (remanding to EPA). 
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House directives to quash regulatory initiatives.  This explains why he did 
not propose a finding that GHG emissions endanger public health and 
welfare and why he weakened other environmental standards presented to 
him for decision.  So long as the agency head insists, as Johnson did, that 
the decision is his own, and not that of the White House, the decision is not 
legally vulnerable unless it is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law or 
procedure, or insufficiently supported in the administrative record. 
Yet agency decisions reached at the behest of White House officials are 
likely to be more vulnerable to legal challenges than are other regulations 
because regulatory review often emphasizes factors that are not made 
relevant by the underlying regulatory statute.  This is well illustrated by the 
USDA’s efforts to have President George H.W. Bush require the FDA to 
adopt nutritional guidelines that would protect the economic interests of the 
domestic meat industry.  The President was informed that if he tried to 
direct the FDA to promulgate more meat-friendly nutrition labels, that “the 
Department can’t just salute smartly and go execute whatever decision” he 
made because the record would not support it.388  If the President were able 
to direct a decision for political reasons that would require an agency to 
manufacture a new administrative record, it would undermine the purposes 
of conducting an informal notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the 
requirements of the APA.389
It is extremely rare, however, that parties seeking judicial review of 
agency action will be able to prove that the President or his staff overrode 
an agency head’s decision.  But it is not impossible.  Vice President 
Quayle’s Council on Competitiveness was so proud of its rejection of 
EPA’s proposed ban on incineration of lead acid batteries and the agency’s 
incinerator recycling requirement that it publicly boasted that it had vetoed 
EPA’s decision.
 
390  One participant in the Council’s closed meeting told the 
press that the real reason for the decision was a “strong sense that they 
needed to give business something” because of “concern that we lost our 
commitment to deregulation.”391
 
 388. KESSLER, supra note 
  Thus it is not surprising that the D.C. 
Circuit struck down EPA’s failure to ban incineration of lead acid batteries 
168, at 68. 
 389. Moreover, as Kevin Stack has ably argued, decisions that can be shown to be the 
product of presidential prodding should be less likely to qualify for Chevron deference from 
a reviewing court. Stack, supra note 20, at 307. But cf. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2376 (arguing 
for linking deference to presidential involvement given the President’s more direct electoral 
accountability); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008) (questioning whether insulating an agency from 
the influence of elected officials reduces the agency’s responsiveness to preferences of 
political majorities). 
 390. President’s Council on Competitiveness Fact Sheet, supra note 149. 
 391. The Council on Competitiveness’s fact sheet cited three reasons for its decision:  (1) 
the recycling requirement was not a performance standard, (2) the regulation interfered with 
local government decision making, and (3) it was not cost-beneficial under Executive Order 
12,291. Id.; see David Littell, Note, The Omission of Materials Separation Requirements 
from Air Standards for Municipal Waste Incinerators:  EPA’s Commitment to Recycling Up 
in Flames, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 601 (1991); Michael Weisskopf, EPA Proposal on 
Recycling Is Trashed, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1990, at A17. 
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as insufficiently supported by the record.392
A federal district court’s invalidation of FDA’s refusal to approve the 
Plan B emergency contraceptive for use by women under eighteen also 
demonstrates that when political interference can be shown, agency 
decisions will get less judicial deference.
  Decisions based on grounds 
divorced from the statutory criteria are vulnerable when subjected to 
judicial review. 
393  This is consistent with 
Professor Stack’s argument that when the statute does not designate the 
President as the regulatory decision maker, decisions dictated by him are 
not entitled to the same level of deference on judicial review.394
Legal scholars who have considered the directive authority issue have 
long agreed on one important point—the President cannot claim directive 
authority over decisions reached by formal adjudicatory procedures.
 
395  
This was confirmed when the Ninth Circuit upheld application of the 
APA’s ban on ex parte contacts in formal adjudicatory hearings to the 
deliberations of the inter-agency “God squad” considering an exemption 
from the ESA during the George H.W. Bush Administration.396
 
 392. New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  The court did note that 
the fact that EPA went along with the Competitiveness Council’s decision “does not mean 
that EPA failed to exercise its own expertise in promulgating the final rules.” Id. at 1152.  As 
Michael Herz notes:  “Although the general understanding, and my own belief, is that EPA 
Administrator William Reilly was forced to cave in to White House commands on the 
incinerator issue, officially the agency and the Council reached consensus, with the latter 
convincing Reilly of the error of his views.” Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive 
Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 224 n.28 (1993); see also 
Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; Municipal Waste Combustors, 56 
Fed. Reg. 5488, 5497 (Feb. 11, 1991).  Herz notes that EPA General Counsel Don Elliott 
later testified:  “The final decision [regarding the incinerator new source performance 
standard] was very clearly made by Bill Reilly, rather than by the Council on 
Competitiveness.” Herz, supra, at 225 n.28 (alteration in original). 
  The court 
concluded that “Congress clearly has the authority” to “create the 
 393. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 394. Stack, supra note 20, at 307. 
 395. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:  THE NEED FOR 
BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 150 (1962) (“Everyone, including the presidential 
activists, seems to agree that ‘the outcome of any particular adjudicatory matter is . . . as 
much beyond his [the President’s] concern . . . as the outcome of any cause pending in the 
courts . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY 
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 33 (1960))); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and 
Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 454 n.11 (1979) (noting “White House efforts 
to forbid staff interference with agency adjudication”); Kagan, supra note 7, at 2306; 
Emmette S. Redford, The President and the Regulatory Commissions, 44 TEX. L. REV. 288 
(1965). (“The President and all other executive officials should avoid any ex parte statement 
or communication concerning the application of law or policy by commissions to particular 
concerns or individuals.” (emphasis omitted)); Peter M. Flanigan, Memorandum, Contacts 
Between the White House and the Independent Regulatory Agencies (May 21, 1969), 
reprinted in In re ITT Continental Baking Co., 82 F.T.C. 1188, 1191 (1973)).  Although 
Calabresi and Yoo do not focus on agency adjudications, they note that during the Nixon 
Administration the Ash Council proposed abolishing most independent agencies and 
transferring adjudicative functions previously performed by them to an Administrative Court 
of the United States. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 351. 
 396. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 (9th 
Cir. 1993); see also text accompanying notes 154–66, supra. 
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Committee as a quasi-judicial adjudicatory body subject to the statutory 
restrictions that the APA imposes on such institutions” in order to “ensure 
the independence of the agency from presidential control.”397  When the 
D.C. Circuit endorsed presidential involvement in regulatory decisions in 
Sierra Club v. Costle,398 Judge Wald was careful to distinguish between 
presidential contacts with agency heads in informal rulemakings (the 
proceeding at issue there) and such contacts in formal adjudications, as the 
Ninth Circuit noted.399  In Sierra Club, Judge Wald observed that even the 
most enthusiastic endorsement of presidential power over agencies in Myers 
v. United States was qualified with the statement that its reasoning did not 
apply to adjudications.400
In her account of President Clinton’s energetic efforts to influence 
agencies, Elena Kagan notes that the “only mode of administrative action 
from which Clinton shrank was adjudication.”
 
401  Kagan reports that 
Clinton was careful to ensure that he never attempted  “to exercise the 
powers that a department head possesses over an agency’s on-the-record 
determinations.”402  She stresses that her argument for inferring presidential 
directive authority from the regulatory statutes does not apply with respect 
to adjudication because of the fundamentally different nature of such 
proceedings and “the different purposes of participation in them.”403  Citing 
the dictum in Myers noted above, Kagan concludes that in the adjudication 
context, “presidential participation in administration, of whatever form, 
would contravene procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence 
into the resolution of controversies.”404  This must “disallow the President 
from disrupting or displacing the procedural, participatory requirements 
associated with agency adjudication, thus preserving their ability to serve 
their intended, special objectives.”405
Yet, absent special procedural requirements specified in the underlying 
regulatory statute, agencies generally have substantial discretion in 
choosing between rulemaking and adjudication as a means for formulating 
and implementing regulatory policy.
 
406
 
 397. Portland Audubon, 984 F.2d at 1547–48. 
  Because adjudications cannot be 
 398. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 399. Portland Audubon, 984 F.2d at 1545 (“In fact, while the Costle court recognized that 
political pressure from the President may not be inappropriate in informal rulemaking 
proceedings, it acknowledged that the contrary is true in formal adjudications.”). 
 400. Id. at 407 n.527 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  Judge Wald noted that statement from Myers that 
“‘there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on . . . executive tribunals whose 
decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President 
can not in a particular case properly influence or control.’” Id. (quoting Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926)). 
 401. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2306. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 2362. 
 404. Id. at 2363. 
 405. Id. 
 406. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]he Board is not 
precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and . . . the choice 
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s 
discretion.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between 
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the subjects of presidential directive authority under any of the theories that 
support it, agencies can insulate themselves from presidential influence by 
choosing to set policy through adjudication.  For example, the National 
Labor Relations Board did not conduct its first rulemaking until the late 
1980s in part because agency officials wanted to insulate Board decisions 
from political pressures.407  Many regulatory agencies like the EPA rely 
almost entirely on rulemaking to set policy,408
CONCLUSION:  DOES DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY MATTER? 
 but the fact that an agency 
could escape presidential directive authority simply by addressing an issue 
through adjudication undercuts the force of arguments for inferring 
directive authority from statutes that permit agencies to choose between 
rulemaking and adjudication. 
Although it is unlikely that the debate over whether the President has the 
legal authority to dictate the substance of regulatory decisions entrusted by 
statute to agency heads ever will be definitively resolved, the view most 
widely accepted by scholars is that the President does not.409
Yet after four decades of experience with presidential oversight of 
rulemaking and three decades of OMB review programs, regulatory review 
  Claims by 
supporters of the unitary executive theory that presidential directive 
authority is constitutionally required have scant support in the constitutional 
text or relevant constitutional history.  Arguments that presidential directive 
authority should be inferred as implicit in statutes granting authority for 
regulatory decisions to agency heads also conflict with the historical 
evidence.  The assumption that prevailed when regulatory statutes were 
adopted was that the President did not have directive authority and the 
executive orders establishing regulatory review by OMB expressly disclaim 
such authority.  The statutes themselves often divide decisonmaking 
responsibilities between agency heads and the President or specify 
circumstances under which the President can override agency decisions 
(mixed agency-President delegations).  These factors, and historical practice 
since the dawn of the modern administrative state, provide strong support 
for the notion that the President lacks directive authority unless Congress 
expressly grants it to him. 
 
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the 
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”). 
 407. WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 323 (3d ed. 
2006); Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking:  An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 
DUKE L.J. 274, 274–75 (1991). 
 408. But cf. Exec. Order No. 13,422, § 5(a), 3 C.F.R. 191, 193 (2008) (stating that 
agencies, “[i]n consultation with OIRA may also consider whether to utilize formal 
rulemaking procedures under 5 U.S.C. [§§] 556 and 557 [the provisions of the APA 
governing formal adjudicatory proceedings] for the resolution of complex determinations”); 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Calls for Trial of Climate Science, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 
26, 2009) http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/aug2009/2009-08-26-091.asp (reporting on 
petition to EPA by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce for formal adjudicatory hearing to 
determine whether emissions of greenhouse gases endanger public health or welfare under 
the Clean Air Act). 
 409. See, e.g., Pierce, Jr., supra note 372, at 596–98; Strauss, supra note 372, at 759–60. 
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has now become an accepted feature of the modern administrative state.  
Recent administrations have been more active (and more successful) than 
ever in efforts to persuade agency heads to pursue policies desired by the 
White House.  One important reason for their success is that these efforts 
now extend far beyond the OMB review process embodied in the executive 
orders.  They include lobbying of agencies by greatly expanded White 
House staffs and policy “czars” not subject to Senate confirmation, and 
presidential directives telling agencies to address particular issues, while 
carefully disclaiming authority to dictate the outcome.410
For example, as Cary Coglianese writes about the Obama directive to 
reconsider the denial of the California waiver, “President Obama’s 
memorandum directing the agency was careful not to tell the EPA that it 
must reverse itself and grant California’s waiver request; instead it simply 
directed the agency to revisit the issue and take appropriate action.”
 
411  But 
as Coglianese points out, “[t]here was no doubt, however, that Obama 
wanted the waiver granted.”412
One of President Reagan’s first acts in office was to establish a Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by Vice President George H.W. 
Bush.
  Does this make the legal question of 
directive authority irrelevant?  History suggests otherwise. 
413  The Task Force wrote to business leaders asking them to 
nominate regulations that should be relaxed or repealed, much like 
Congressman Darrell Issa’s committee is doing today in the newly 
Republican-controlled House.414  After oil industry executives nominated 
EPA’s limits on lead in gasoline, the Reagan White House directed EPA 
Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford to relax or repeal the lead limits.  
EPA was allowed to propose abolishing these regulations without 
conducting any cost-benefit analysis of them, on the grounds that the new 
Executive Order 12,291 requiring such analysis only applied to new 
regulations and not to the repeal of existing ones.415
 
 410. See Pierce, Jr., supra note 
  But when subjected to 
the notice-and-comment process for rulemaking under the APA, the 
proposal to repeal the lead limits generated such a public outcry, including a 
persuasive op-ed from President Reagan’s new friend, columnist George 
372, at 600 (“The transparent systematic control 
mechanisms used by OIRA to control the bureaucracy, however, are not now, and never 
have been, the most important means through which Presidents, and presidential 
subordinates who purport to be acting on behalf of the President, exercise control over the 
bureaucracy.  Largely invisible ad hoc White House jawboning is now, and always has been, 
far more important in its impact on agency policy decisions.”); see also Lisa Schultz 
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:  A Critical Look at 
the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006) (an empirical study 
finding that EPA is lobbied by myriad White House staffers outside of the OMB review 
process). 
 411. Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies:  A Debate over 
Law or Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 643–44 (2010). 
 412. Id. at 644. 
 413. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 148. 
 414. Id.; Binyamin Appelbaum, G.O.P. Asks Businesses Which Rules To Rewrite, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at B1. 
 415. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 187–89. 
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Will,416
As a practical matter the absence of presidential directive authority 
means that Presidents must persuade agency heads when they want to 
influence regulatory decisions entrusted by law to them.  Given the 
President’s authority to remove at will the principal officers of executive 
agencies, it is easy for the President to persuade agency heads to do what he 
wants.  However, as discussed in detail above, history demonstrates that 
removals have substantial political costs.
 that the agency ultimately strengthened the lead limits.  EPA later 
phased out all lead from gasoline, perhaps the greatest success story for 
public health in EPA history.  Thus, even though Presidents have long 
sought to influence agency rulemaking priorities, the White House cannot 
legally dictate a particular regulatory outcome without the agency first 
considering evidence submitted during a notice-and-comment procedure.  
Agency heads ultimately may refuse to promulgate initiatives that would be 
contrary to the agency’s statutory responsibility or else risk having them 
invalidated in court. 
417
 
  In the rare case where a 
presidential appointee so fundamentally disagrees with what the President 
wants that he refuses to comply, the absence of a legal entitlement to direct 
the appointee’s action provides a useful check on presidential abuses of 
power, as this Article demonstrates. 
 
 416. George F. Will, The Poison Poor Children Breathe, reprinted in LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT:  A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 109 (Robert V. Percival & Dorothy C. 
Alevizatos eds., 1997). 
 417. For a discussion of additional contemporary examples of the political costs of 
removals, including President George W. Bush’s decision to remove seven U.S. attorneys, 
see Pierce, Jr., supra note 372, at 607–10. 
